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ABSTRACT
Honeywell Aerospace has been a leader in manufacturing high quality engines to customers
for decades. With engine and auxiliary power unit (APU) growth of -9% in 2005, and
projected growth similar or greater for 2006, however, some segments of the business are
experiencing difficulty in delivering engines on time to customer request dates. In the spirit
of Lean Enterprise, Honeywell must to deliver value to its customers by stepping back and
analyzing the entire value stream. Enterprise-level optimization of supply chain, assembly,
and test practices will lead to the greatest benefit to both internal and external stakeholders.
This thesis explores the issues within one segment of the Aerospace business - specifically,
new engine and APU deliveries -- as well as internal initiatives to drive high quality and lean
manufacturing. A Lean Enterprise Self Assessment Tool survey was conducted to highlight
opportunities to propel Honeywell to a culture of high performance. Both high-level multi-
million dollar opportunities, as well as low-budget, improved processes and communication
initiatives will be discussed. Ultimately, the Honeywell Aerospace Engine Assembly and
Test Center of Excellence must sacrifice narrow use of lean tools for wide ranging promotion
of lean principles, thereby improving the overall value delivery to all enterprise stakeholders.
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INTRODUCTION
Honeywell Engines deals with significant variation in its manufacturing volume of
commercial propulsion engines. This variation is largely due failure to get all necessary parts
to the manufacturing floor on schedule. Although there are tactical projects Honeywell
Engines can undertake in order to improve their assembly and test of engines, the majority of
the issues must be tackled at the supply chain level. In addition, Honeywell Engines must
undertake a cultural shift towards adopting the fundamental philosophy of Lean Enterprise in
order to foster innovation and sustain improvement in its entire value stream.
Background
Honeywell Aerospace has been using Six Sigma and Lean Manufacturing principles
since 1999 when it was purchased by Allied Signal1 . The "new generation of Six Sigma" at
Honeywell is a proprietary system called "Six Sigma Plus"2 . In the spirit of lean, Honeywell
Aerospace has one major objective: to improve customer service. The business recently
reorganized in an attempt to be more customer-friendly 3. Customers now have a single point
of contact within the organization to contact with questions or concerns about any product
produced across Honeywell Aerospace, whereas in the past the customer had to call different
offices for issues with engines, Auxiliary Power Units (APUs), avionics, brakes, and so on 4
(see Figure 1 below).
Internal/External Auxiliary Power Unit (APU)
Figure 1: Honeywell Aerospace Business & General Aviation Sales Areas
Reorganizing the groups that face the customer was only the first step to improving
customer satisfaction. Internal groups, like Honeywell's Engine Assembly and Test Center of
Excellence, still have much room for improvement to meet On Time to Request (OTTR)
promise dates for new engines and overall service turnaround time dates. Although military
products have a high OTTR for 2005, commercial product OTTR has fluctuated around 50% 5.
Aerospace top leaders are increasingly aware that something must be done to improve this
service, especially as the corporation heads into another year of >9% projected growth6 .
While lean principles may be valued in the Six Sigma Plus mentality, Honeywell needs to
expand its definition of Lean to include the Lean Enterprise. The areas with the most
opportunity for improvement are Supply Chain and Inventory Management.
As part of the Aerospace industry, Honeywell faces many challenges in its supply
chain. Raw materials are expensive, and have long lead times. Suppliers have problems
meeting order deadlines, and changing customer requests force late orders and expediting
parts. When engine parts are late, Honeywell employees work overtime and weekends to try
to ship engines as quickly as possible, and a very non-linear shipment schedule results.
Expansion of Engines Problems
In Engine Assembly and Test, supply chain issues give rise to slow monthly starts, and
fire-fighting at the end of each month to get engines out the door. This push is intensified at
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quarter ends, and even more so at year end. Bell (2000) explains that this is due to
"accounting measures that close the books at the end of the month and summarize at the end
of the quarters. This causes people, driven by end-of-month and end-of-quarter quotas, to
historically perform during these times to make the numbers."7 Strategic gains attempted in
lean manufacturing are stymied by overwhelming tactical problems in the supply chain, and at
the end of the month/quarter/year, the only sense of urgency is to build, test, package, and
deliver as quickly as possible with little time left for sustaining continuous improvement.
Interestingly, since only 1% of the total process time and cost occurs in the assembly line,
most researchers agree that in order to make significant improvements to on time delivery of
engines is to focus on supply chain improvements. This thesis will offer relief for companies
concerned with attacking such a large and complicated problem, however, by proposing that
supply chain quality and delivery problems can be buffered by a critical safety stock
inventory. This inventory can be reduced as real improvements are made in the supply chain,
but can actually allow for a reduction in the overall inventory held by the company. The lens
for the research presented in this thesis is that of Lean Enterprise: considering stakeholders
and change initiatives with the entire organization in mind, rather than implementing local
solutions that may just shift the bottleneck.
This thesis is based on a 7.5 month Massachusetts Institute of Technology Leaders for
Manufacturing internship at the Honeywell Aerospace Engine Assembly and Test Center of
Excellence. While the internship focused on two tactical projects, it became apparent very
quickly that the major issue affecting Assembly and Test was the overall Aerospace problems
in the supply chain. Therefore, the thesis will not only discuss the Assembly and Test tactical
projects, but also how they fit into the Honeywell's overall Engines Product Center, which is
part of the Aerospace Integrated Supply Chain organization. In this thesis, I will describe the
root cause of the problems in the supply chain for the heaviest hit product line: Commercial
Propulsion Engines. In identifying the source of the supply chain problems, a methodology
for analyzing the available data and a proposal for putting it to use in improvement will be
offered. Only after improving the biggest problem in the enterprise will the tactical projects
offer true value to Honeywell customers.
Chapter Outline
This thesis is organized into ten chapters. The first chapter discusses the biggest
problems at Honeywell's Engines Product Center, specifically in the supply chain. It also
describes how these issues affect the assembly line. Finally, there is a discussion of other
improvements being made within Assembly and Test to try to improve engine quality and on
time delivery.
Chapter Two references the literature on Lean Enterprise, and how other aerospace
companies have used lean enterprise principles, including how they have resolved their supply
chain issues. This chapter also builds on the literature to describe how these lean enterprise
principles can work for Honeywell engines, and the leadership challenges that complex
products like engines face when attempting to use these principles. The next three chapters:
three, four, and five, discuss each area of the internship's focus. Chapter Three describes the
biggest issue: the supply chain, procurement, and inventory management. Chapter Four
discusses the Green Belt engine assembly area layout project. Chapter Five covers the new
quality initiative in test: creating and implementing an Electronic Test Aid.
Chapter Six will tie the project focus areas together with Lean Enterprise principles.
This chapter will also discuss the value stream in great detail, the breakdowns of the value
stream within Assembly and Test, and discusses the X-Matrix and how metrics must be used
to align the organization. In Chapter Seven, the Lean Enterprise Self Assessment Tool survey
that was conducted as part of the internship study will be presented. The results help illustrate
real issues at Honeywell within the Lean Enterprise framework, and highlight cultural issues
at Honeywell that must be considered when transitioning to a Lean Enterprise.
Chapter Eight continues with the cultural theme while discussing the leadership
challenges that await Honeywell when they start to implement the theory put forth in the
thesis. Chapter Nine culminates with a concise set of recommendations and tactical next steps
that Honeywell can do, both in the immediate and long terms. Finally, Chapter Ten will seek
to summarize what has been learned and offer key takeaways for the thesis.
Introduction Summary
Honeywell is a world-renowned name in aerospace, and has a long corporate history of
driving to Six Sigma quality. Honeywell Engines now faces the challenge of incorporating
lean principles into its six sigma philosophy. The version of lean that Honeywell needs to
consider must not only encompass lean manufacturing, but must extend to integrating the
Lean Enterprise. By leveraging the Lean Enterprise, Honeywell will improve its entire Value
Stream in Engines, including the supply chain, which is where many downstream problems
are caused. In this way, Honeywell Engines can truly benefit from its lean activities to
improve its on time to customer request metric, and also its corporate culture.
CHAPTER ONE: Honeywell Engines Product Center Assembly
and Test Overview
Honeywell's Engines Product Center builds and tests jet and helicopter engines as
well as Auxiliary Power Units (APUs) for both commercial and military customers. Suppliers
ship parts to the Engines Assembly and Test site for storage in the Stores area. These parts
are then pulled from Stores according to the Material Production System planning schedule
for assembly on the manufacturing floor. Assembled engines and APUs are wheeled to the
test cells located at the same physical site, and a variety of performance and quality tests are
performed by test technicians. After testing and final inspection, the engine is packaged and
shipped to the customer.
Supply Chain Issues
At the Engines Assembly and Test facility there is a drastic difference in the on time
to request performance across business units. Helicopter engines are always on time. Both
military and commercial APUs ship very close to on time performance goals. The site
average is just below the median performance, which is comparable to the Military APU
performance in the figure below. However, since both Commercial APU and Helicopters are
very good, the low performer dragging down the average is consistently Commercial
Propulsion engines. The figure below has been disguised for privacy, but the sales segment
relationships are accurate.
Commercial APUs Commercial MilitaryAPUs Helicopters
engines
Relative OTTR Performance of Engine Segments
Performance:
Very Good
Good
Average
Poor
Very Poor
Figure 2: Relative on Time to Request Performance of Engine Sales Segments
Figure 2 highlights the staggering problem in Commercial engine OTTR as compared
to the other business segments. Although many suppliers are common among all the
segments, and parts are similar, there is a fundamental discrepancy causing commercial
engines to be later than other engine types.
When analyzing this problem, the various inputs to building an engine must be
considered. These inputs span the entire engine value stream, starting from customer order
placement, through planning, purchasing, production, assembly, test, and shipping. The high
level value stream for an engine is shown in Figure 3 below:
Figure 3: High Level Engine Value Stream Map
Customers are required to place a Purchase Order 90 days prior to their request date.
When the PO is entered into the Material Production System, it will generate automatic orders
for parts with a "Just in Time" philosophy. That is, taking into account lead times and
assembly cycle times, an order will be placed electronically with each supplier with just
enough advanced notice to build the engine in time for the customer's order, but not hold
inventory longer than required for the engine assembly process.
Theoretically, the "Just in Time" ordering system is triggered by the customer's
"pull," and inventory is not held on site to "push" engines out. Material flows through the
system smoothly, and engines are shipped to the customer on time.
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There are, however, a number of factors that could cause the theoretical "Just in Time
Pull" system to fail. The first and foremost is when material lead times exceed the 90 day
advanced notice for engine orders. This is true in nearly all cases at the Honeywell Engines
Product Center, with the average Lead Time for all parts in a high volume engine being -60
days, but ranging from 0 to 375 days.a APUs tend to have lower average lead times, with a
high volume APU average lead time of -36 days, but the 0 to 375 day range is consistent with
engines.
When lead times exceed customer PO advanced notice, Honeywell is required to use
forecasts to place orders for parts. Different people will describe forecast accuracy in various
colorful terms, but E. Silver et al summarize quite eloquently saying, "Only one thing is
certain... - the forecast will be in error."s Given this unquestionable fact, one can only assume
that however many long lead time parts Honeywell orders prior to the PO being made, it will
either be too many or too few. In the case of too many, Honeywell may either hold the
inventory, or elect to return it. In the case of too few, however, Honeywell must call in high
priority orders, paying a premium for a faster shipment, or purchase the materials from a
competitor who may hold inventory in these parts.
Another issue affecting OTTR is that Honeywell, being a customer-oriented company,
will sometimes allow customers to change their POs within the 90 day contract time with no
penalty. This affects both the long lead time parts by changing the forecast again, but
moreover affects parts with Lead Times that are less than 90 days. Although these cases are
relatively rare, they are known to occur, and can adversely affect the OTTR metric.
Even if everything does go according to customer PO dates, and somehow the forecast
was correct for long lead time parts, there can always be delays in supplier shipments or
internally manufactured components. Suppliers have raw material issues causing delays,
sometime parts will arrive that do not meet Honeywell quality standards, and will have to be
sent back, or other unforeseen events (weather, higher priority customers paying a premium,
transportation logistics, etc) will cause engine parts to arrive late for assembly.
The situation is not hopeless, however. Honeywell could eliminate many stock outs by
holding inventory according to their desired service level. The problem lies in determining
a Note: All "days" are working days where 5 days = 1 calendar week. Thus, 375 days = 75 weeks or - 1 year 5
months. The customer PO advanced notice of 90 days is also working days - so this corresponds to -4.5
months.
which parts to hold. Engines have over 6000 unique parts, and APUs have over 2000.
Holding all of these parts would be costly, and most likely unnecessary. However, if the 80-
20 rule applies (i.e. 80% of the delays are caused by 20% of the parts), Honeywell could hold
only a strategic subset of inventory required to build an engine. Further analysis will be done
in Chapter Five to explore this concept.
Using an enterprise approach such as looking at the entire value stream to find
problems is one way to address issues in customer on time delivery. However, delivering
engines on time fulfills only one of the two major customer requirements. The other
requirement is to deliver a high quality engine - one that will not need to be returned for
mechanical failure, and will run with no issues at least until it has accumulated the number of
hours recommended for maintenance.
Assembly and Test Issues
Quality assembly of an engine starts with the quality of parts. However, once defect-
free parts have arrived and the engine is "clear,'"b the engine assembly and test is all done
onsite. Honeywell encourages mechanics and technicians to complete Green Belt training in
Six Sigma Plusc. Six sigma and lean principles are used to layout assembly and test areas.
Work stations are taped out, parts are labeled and sorted, areas are cleaned and layouts
standardized across cells. However, single piece flow and takt time are not used due to the
irregularities in parts procurement. Linearity is a major issue for assembly and test with more
engines being built and tested at the end of the month than the beginning, even more at the
end of a quarter, and a frenzy of activity at the end of the year.
b Having an engine be "clear" means that all the parts required to build that engine are onsite at the Assembly
facility.
C Honeywell nominally requires Green Belt certification in order to be promoted past a certain skill level.
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Figure 4: Shipments per Month as a Percentage of Average Monthly Shipments
Linearity problems create a fire-fighting atmosphere in the Assembly and Test areas.
The constant swing of high and low activities is a vicious cycle. Periods of high activity drain
the workforce and the subsequent periods of low activity is when people recover. The
motivation for continuous improvement is low. These issues are viewed as insignificant when
compared to the overall parts problems.
Despite the more pressing issues in procurement, however, there are opportunities to
use Lean Enterprise principles to improve engine Assembly and Test. In addition,
improvements made in supply chain management will lead to a more linear flow of engines
through the Assembly and Test areas, effectively "lowering the water level" to the point
where quality and time improvements will truly impact engine cycle time and OTTR. Engine
assembly can be done in a more visual manner, and mechanics will be more motivated to
offer continuous improvement solutions. In Test, one project under implementation is to use
an electronic test aid to assist with standardization of tests as well as reduce human error
leading to retesting and prolonging overall test time. Currently, tests are completed to written
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instructions, and section signoffs, engine preparation data, and remarks are hand entered to a
test summary sheet. Although sale performance tests are saved electronically, there are no
checks in place to ensure each performance point passes until all of them are complete and the
final sale sheet prints. If there was a problem in an early sale test, the entire test will have to
be rerun, costing both engine time as well as test cell capacity. Also, any difficulty in reading
technician handwriting can result in communication difficulties across shifts and with
engineering. Once tests are completed, the paperwork generated to sell the engine is scanned
into PDF format and burned to a CD. The paperwork is also stored, and between these two
physical data storage means, any future review of the data must be done manually.
Using an electronic test instruction can automate section signoffs, electronically
capture preparation test data, provide sale test results in real time, and offer a legible
transaction history of all engine test requirements. Furthermore, test data can be
electronically stored in searchable format for ease of further review. Data can also be saved
on servers with backups, thereby mitigating any risk of damage, loss, fire, or other natural
disasters which could affect the current physical storage methods.
A Lean Enterprise scope of the entire Assembly and Test process can improve linearity
to allow consistency in daily work, and thereby raise awareness for further improvement in
the actual engine Assembly and Test processes.
Summary
Honeywell Engines builds and test various commercial and military products, although
its on time to customer request metric varies drastically among these segments. While the
overall value stream is similar for different products, variations in part lead times and
customer request dates give rise to different OTTR performance between segments.
However, if Honeywell were to apply the 80/20 rule to all incoming parts, it could likely find
pockets of poor supplier delivery that lie beneath downstream problems. If supplier issues are
resolved, variations in engine assembly linearity can be reduced, and overall customer OTTR
will improve. Honeywell can then focus on lower level tactical projects that will improve its
overall quality and technological edge. Using a Lean Enterprise level approach will allow
Honeywell to leverage its supply chain and assembly operations in order to improve value to
the end customer.
CHAPTER TWO: Literature Review
There is a wealth of information available in the literature on lean manufacturing. The
study of Lean Enterprise, however, is a more recent development. Although Lean Enterprise
stems from the philosophies of lean manufacturing, it expands the traditionally narrow view
of lean to incorporate all aspects of a firm's activities and strategy. Lean Enterprise has
become particularly relevant in highly complex industries such as Aerospace. This chapter
incorporates a discussion of the literature from both a lean and Lean Enterprise vantage point,
and seeks to argue that the latter is the more appropriate philosophy for the Aerospace
Industry. Literature pertaining to how Lean Enterprise is utilized in aerospace companies
other than Honeywell is also provided.
Lean Enterprise and the Lean Aerospace Initiative
Lean Enterprise is a body of thought that has emerged from traditional lean
manufacturing concepts. In 1990, John Womack, Daniel Jones, and Daniel Roos of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology published "The Machine that Changed the World."
Based on research conducted at thirty-eight automobile manufacturers in thirteen different
companies, the book itself changed the world as much as its namesake would suggest. The
fundamental concept that the book described was coined by MIT masters student John
Krafcik, the idea that a company was "lean," as it appeared they were "doing more with less."
Krafcik was referring specifically to the Toyota Motor Company, who was able to
manufacture cars with one-third the defects, built in half the amount of factory space, and
using half the number of labor hours of its competition across the globe. 9
Toyota's methodology has been coined the Toyota Production System, and is widely
considered to be the role model upon which the lean world is founded. Indeed, Womak writes
in 2003 that "We concluded that best of the best was Toyota. This company ... became our
image of the business system to copy or exceed."10
However, the term "lean" has been distorted in the literature over the years, and the
actual definition has come to mean many different things, depending on the author or
audience. The ambiguity surrounding lean is summarized well by an MIT doctoral student in
his thesis Lean Enterprise Self-Assessment as a Leading Indicator for Accelerating
Transformation in the Aerospace Industry:"
Some confusion has crept into the literature on the subject, as people often refer to
"lean" manufacturing companies as either those embracing the lean philosophy, those
utilizing tools and techniques seen in the Toyota Production System, those exhibiting
state characteristics that appear to be lean, or some combination of these. The
problem with this kind of terminology is that people attempting to adopt the lean
manufacturing paradigm may not clearly understand the transformation they are
trying to achieve. Do they attempt to emulate the end-state by any means necessary or
do they simply mirror the methodologies of "lean" role models and wait for the end-
state to emerge?"
This description insinuates what many employees witness first hand. Their companies have
not defined lean for themselves, and are merely using the term loosely, but publicly, to
indicate to their competitors that they too are using lean. In this, the company may try to do
"lean" things; create value stream maps, define as is and to be process states, implement a
kanban system, get an andon board, have a few kaizen events. Indeed, employees at many
companies are thoroughly disgusted with lean, thinking that it is merely a "flavor of the
month" initiative, and really what it means is that several jobs are likely to be cut. This is
quite unfortunate, because the real root of lean is truly about a mindset shift. It is about
organizing the entire enterprise to achieve the greatest value as an end result, and remaining
flexible to potential perturbations that could affect the status quo. As people began to realize
that lean was not necessarily just about manufacturing, and even to see that places like Toyota
used it when setting enterprise wide goals, such as achieving 10% market share by 2000, a
new body of thought began to surface: Lean enterprise.
In 1993, the Lean Aerospace Initiative (LAI) 12 was formed as a research initiative that
"focuses on the use of lean practices - integrated product and process development,
optimized product flow, and employee growth - to improve aerospace businesses."' 3 Co-
founded by MIT professors and aerospace industry leaders, LAI has developed a framework
for evaluating the level of lean at an enterprise. This framework is not restricted to aerospace
industries, but rather can be used across a variety of industries wishing to improve their
understanding of their own "lean-ness."
The LAI has redefined lean from the traditional sense of doing things to eliminate
waste to a new way of thinking that also involves creation of value. In the book Lean
Enterprise Value, the LAI has defined becoming lean as "a process of eliminating
waste with the goal of creating value for enterprise stakeholders."' 4 In Lean Enterprise Value,
five principles are espoused as guidelines for an enterprise seeking to become lean. The
underlying theme to these principles is that lean is not just a matter of eliminating waste. It is
a matter of creating value. While eliminating waste is certainly a part of that, it cannot be
applied blindly or universally. Rather, when looking to eliminate waste, one must consider
the entire value stream for the enterprise. Reducing inventory in one area, for example, could
have disastrous effects down the line, and does not necessarily improve value to stakeholders.
However, holding strategic inventory in some locations may improve the overall stakeholder
value, and ultimately reduce inventory for the whole enterprise.
The LAI has also defined a lean enterprise "in its most generic sense as follows:
A lean enterprise is an integrated entity that efficiently creates value for its
multiple stakeholders by employing lean principles and practices."
This definition is very broad, but manages to remain flexible enough for all businesses to
aspire to follow it. There are no rules dictating that specific tools that must be used to become
"lean." There is not one set method to achieve lean that can be applied indiscriminately to all
companies. Rather, the LAI respects that companies are all different, with different cultures,
stakeholders, and goals that they must accomplish. Still, the LAI is not mute when it comes
to how to become lean. They provide five guiding principles in Lean Enterprise Value that
seek to give direction to organizations wishing to become lean: 14
Principle 1: Create lean value by doing the job right and by doing the right job.
Principle 2: Deliver value only after identifying stakeholder value and constructing robust
value propositions.
Principle 3: Fully realize lean value only by adopting an enterprise perspective.
Principle 4: Address the interdependencies across enterprise levels to increase lean value.
Principle 5: People, not just processes, effectuate lean value.
Using Honeywell Assembly and Test as an enterprise example, these principles could
be applied to shift the mindset of the organization. Do the job right, but be sure to do the right
job also. In other words, if there is a way to improve the amount of work being done:
streamline, create processes, and automate where human intercession is not needed - do it!
Do the job right, but try to minimize the amount of redundant work being done. As for the
second principle, Honeywell Assembly and Test has done a good job of identifying two
primary goals: On Time to Request, with high quality (no returns for poor quality). These
goals reflect the majority of the stakeholders in the organization. However, the value
proposition has not been created yet. How will Honeywell deliver to these values in a way
that is robust and can be flexible with changing market demand, global sourcing issues, and
product tolerances tightening all the time? This is where Honeywell still needs work. The
best way to try to determine these robust value propositions would be for Assembly and Test
to look at their entire enterprise. Where does the value stream break down? Why are
Honeywell's goals not being achieved 100% of the time? What upstream factors to Assembly
and Test can impact their ability to deliver on time and with high quality? Where, within the
organization, can Assembly and Test improve towards its values? With respect to Principle 4,
has Honeywell Assembly and Test addressed all the interdependencies that it relies on in
order to deliver product on time with high quality? Finally, what do the people need to do in
order to make these things happen? Anyone can talk about what needs to be done, write
down processes that should be followed. However, unless the people that are tasked with
doing these jobs buy into the new ideas, change will never materialize.
Lean Enterprise Self Assessment Tool (LESAT)
The Lean Enterprise Self Assessment Tool, or LESAT was adapted for use in this thesis.
LESAT is a survey designed to help organizations evaluate their current Lean Enterprise
performance and compare it to their desired state. The survey conducted for this thesis used
many of the same categories the original LESAT survey had, but the descriptors for each
section have been modified to better reflect the Honeywell environment. The three sections
of the LESAT survey are I: Lean Leadership, II: Life Cycle Processes, and III: Enabling
Infrastructure. Section I has seven "links" (A-G), of which only 6 were considered relevant
(A-E, G). Section II has six links, of which only two were considered relevant (D & E). Both
links (A & B) in Section III were considered relevant.
The "enterprise" considered was the Assembly Test area, for which the value stream
above is relevant. Twenty surveys were conducted, ranging from hourly mechanics and
technicians, to middle management, as well as executive level managers for the Assembly and
Test area. Responders were asked to consider all of Assembly and Test from their perspective
when answering the survey. Scoring was assigned a 1-5 ranking, and responders had a scale
legend to review during the survey. The official LAI LESAT tool uses different descriptions
for scores in each section. In the survey conducted at Honeywell, a simplified single legend
was used in order to minimize complexity and possible confusion for the Honeywell
audience. The modified legend is shown below:
Figure 5: Modified LESAT Survey Legend
The survey itself is shown in the Appendix. Answers were analyzed using the LESAT
calculator, which provides Mean, Variance, and Range for both the current and desired states
of each section, as well as each question in each section. It also provides a gap summary for
each section and individual question.
The results of the survey will be discussed in Chapter Seven. Generalizations dealing
with leadership challenges Honeywell faces when trying to improve their Lean Enterprise
organization will be presented in Chapter Eight. Recommendations arising from the survey
will be presented in Chapter Nine.
Lean Enterprise in Other Aerospace Companies
Several other aerospace companies have dealt with supply chain and inventory
management issues. In an MIT Mechanical Engineering thesis written in 1998 by Luis G.
Ramirez-de-Arellano, a study of aircraft engine manufacturing at Pratt & Whitney, Allison
Engine, and General Electric highlighted best practices by one of the companies for managing
their entire engines enterprise. Although the companies were not identified by name, the
basic premise of this thesis is that one of these companies ("Company C") uses a "Hybrid with
80% Pull."15 Figure 6 below is from this thesis and depicts how the 80% hybrid system
works:
1 Not doing, not aware
2 Aware, starting
3 Using, room for improvement
4 Very good, minor improvement
5 Perfect - could teach this!
kanban parts - 80% of parts value kanban
Figure 6: 80% Hybrid Pull System
In this system, customers provide forecasts up to a year ahead, and actual production
is within 10% of the forecast. Then, two weeks before the month an engine is supposed to be
built in, the company calls the customer and the exact number of engines they need is verified
and the build schedule for the coming month is frozen. This is when the 80% hybrid comes
in. 80% of the total value-worth of parts is on a pull system. One set of parts is on the
assembly plant floor ready to be worked on. Another set of parts engine parts for engines are
stored in bins at a warehouse. The third set is at suppliers to be refilled. Also, engines do not
begin to be built until all the parts are "clear" (available at the assembly plant for the build).
In this way, a half-built engine never sits in a build stand and prevents that stand from being
used for another engine.
The other two companies use different planning schedules. One uses a build-to-order
MPS plan, and the other uses a build-to-forecast system where monthly demand is pre-
scheduled and line managers determine how to allocate builds throughout the month. One of
the other sites also has expediters who check parts for engines a few days before they are
scheduled to arrive. If they have not yet been received at the assembly area, the expediters
will contact the suppliers to try to get the parts there as quickly as possible. And unlike
Company C, both of the other two companies allow engines to begin build prior to parts being
clear.
When compared to the other two companies studied in this thesis, Company C takes
less time to build an engine on average, the range of build times is much narrower, and the
empty bins / information
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average days late insignificant compared to the other two companies: This is shown in Figure
7 below:
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Figure 7: Actual Averages and Ranges of Build Times
As shown in Figure 7, Company C performs much better than A or B. The thesis also
provides data describing the average days late each engine is, normalized by number of parts.
Again, Company C is the shining star, with only a few days late compared to 15-120. "The
closest engine, A2, had an average delay 4 times greater than Cl and C2 combined." This
exhibit is shown below as Figure 8.15 Both Figures 7 & 8 can be compared with Figure 34 in
Chapter 6 of this thesis for Honeywell, which matches Companies A & B closer than
Company C.
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Figure 8: Average Days Late for Engines at A, B, C
Another measure of efficiency discussed in this thesis was the work schedule at A, B,
and C. Both the first two sites had three shift operations with high levels of overtime, but site
C has only two shifts and virtually no overtime. Again, Honeywell operates similarly to
Companies A & B with three shifts and plenty of overtime, especially at the end of the month
or quarter.
The way that Company C has been able to perform at such a high level is by
considering the entire value stream - starting with the customer and freezing production
schedules, through the supply chain and ensuring parts availability, and ending with the
manufacturing and shipping to the customer to close the loop. This concept of beginning to
end optimization is the foundation for Lean Enterprise. In his Masters thesis, Lean Enterprise
Self-Assessment as a Leading Indicator for Accelerating Transformation in the Aerospace
Industry, Hallam states the following:
The literature suggests that a focus on localized manufacturing improvements may not
result in large (if any) gains to companies. It is even suggested that more effective
improvements with lean, that do affect the bottom line, lie outside the world of the
manufacturing cell, or even manufacturing in general. There is thus a need to look at
the systems-perspective of lean improvements to ensure that lean efforts manifest
themselves in true performance gains. A systems-level perspective suggests looking at
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all of the business processes in a company beyond manufacturing, as well as the
supply chain partners who help create the product, and the stakeholders who derive
value from the business. This systems-level perspective is called the "enterprise"
perspective.
This is the spirit that motivates the analysis and recommendations provided in this thesis for
Honeywell Engines. A lean enterprise approach focused on the particular company and its
specific problems can identify novel solutions and improvements that will benefit not only a
small subset of the enterprise, but the entire enterprise as a whole.
Summary
This chapter describes how the Lean Enterprise perspective can provide more value to a firm
than a traditional lean manufacturing focus. The Lean Aerospace Initiative was founded on
the need for a complex industry to consider a lean approach to enterprise level problems. The
LESAT tool is an insightful method that the LAI developed for firms to assess their current
and future Lean Enterprise states. Several Aerospace companies have already adopted Lean
Enterprise philosophies by extending lean to their supply chain. In studying Lean Enterprise
and other Aerospace companies' successes, Honeywell can better understand how it too can
develop a Lean Enterprise.
CHAPTER THREE: Procurement/Inventory Management at
Honeywell
There are several facets to procurement and inventory management. Honeywell
forecasts sales and sends purchase orders to suppliers to meet those forecasts. However, a
comparison of Honeywell's commercial products shows that APUs consistently outperform
Engines in terms of On Time to Customer Request. This chapter seeks to discover the root
cause to that discrepancy, and offers a potential solution with respect to inventory
management from a Lean Enterprise perspective.
Detailed Description of the Problem
Ask just about anyone in the engine Assembly and Test area whit their biggest
problem is to delivering engines on time, and they will say "parts." The biggest problem to
delivering engines on time is having the right parts available when the Material Production
System specifies the date to start building the engine. As was specified in Exhibit B,
Commercial Propulsion engines exhibit the worst performance in On Time to Customer
Request as compared to commercial APUs and military APU or helicopter engines. I will
ignore military customers in this discussion, as Honeywell management has described
military customers as much more lenient than industry customers in terms of cost, the
advanced notice for order placement, and their willingness to be flexible with receipt dates.
For the sake of comparison, I will assume that Commercial Propulsion engines have similar
pressures from customers as Commercial APUs. Therefore, I will attempt to find
discrepancies between CAPU and CP that could lead to the root cause of CP's poor OTTR.
When comparing Commercial Propulsion engines to Commercial APUs, the following
seven causes for discrepancy will be considered:
1. Forecast Accuracy & Variability: Do APU forecasts change less than engine
forecasts, and are these forecasts more accurate to actual shipments for APUs than
engines?
2. Volume/Complexity: When APUs and engines are normalized for number of parts
complexity as well as volume, does Honeywell ship more engines than APUs?
3. Year over Year Growth: Does the growth of the business impact OTTR
performance?
4. Supplier Management: Are there more suppliers for engines than APUs, thereby
increasing the supply chain communication complexity? How many suppliers are
common among engines and APUs, and how many are unique?
5. Supplier Discrepancies: How do both common and unique suppliers perform in
terms of on time parts delivery to Honeywell?
The first hypothesis deals with forecasts. Forecast accuracy plays a key role in providing on
time orders. A good rule of thumb for forecasts is that they are always wrong. However,
Silver et al provides a list of necessary factors for an "ideal" forecasting system:
1. Estimate expected demand (in physical units in the short run, but likely in a more
aggregate unit in longer term forecasts).
2. Estimate the probable range of actual demand around the expected value (that is,
forecast errors).
3. Provide forecasts in a timely manner (that is, sufficiently in advance of any decision
that must be made).
4. Update forecasts periodically so that revisions can be taken care ofpromptly.
5. Balance the costs offorecast errors made versus the cost of generating forecasts.
6. Allow human judgment to override mechanical forecasts.
7. Be robust (that is, provide forecasts that are not overly sensitive to uncontrollable
factors).
Honeywell uses their Material Production System to provide forecasts and track firm
Purchase Orders (PO). The system forecasts two years in advance of expected shipments,
which is necessary for Honeywell as some supplier Lead Times exceed 350 working days
(-1.5 years). One planner describes the difficulty with using forecasts that do not have firm
POs and even ones that do as follows:
"If the engines in the (forecast toold) are forecasted (no firm PO), then the accuracy
may be suspect. If the demand for the engines is on a firm PO, then the accuracy is
much better. That is not to say that things won't change, but the reliability is higher.
The biggest problem we have with engines on afirm PO (at least on the Commercial
Propulsion side) is that the OEMse have a tendency to want to add more engines to the
schedule, not take them out. "
d The forecast tool's actual name is not used for privacy.
e Original Equipment Manufacturer
Honeywell has a 90 day contract policy for its customers. That means that theoretically
customers cannot change a firm Purchase Order 90 working days out from the request date.
However, as the planner discussed above, many customers do not adhere to this requirement.
Honeywell has chosen to allow customers to change their orders in the spirit of customer
focus and putting the customer first. However, they do not provide incentives for customers
to not change their orders, nor do they impose penalties when customers change their
contracts. In other words, their forecasts are not robust given actual scenarios. One method
of determining how much the forecasts fluctuate with reality is to save forecasts and compare
them to the actual sales data once the time has passed. Collecting this information over time
may give Honeywell insight into the relative accuracy of its forecasts, as well as offer clues
on how to alter forecasts to predict the true nature of sales.
There are distinct challenges when trying to measure forecast accuracy with the MRP
data on hand. While both the forecast tool's predictions and actual shipments are readily
available, it is difficult to say whether the discrepancies between the two by month are due to
forecast errors, or merely because the engines could not be built in the specified month due to
parts shortage issues. The forecast from December 2004 for the 2005 year compared to actual
shipments in 2005 are shown in Figures 9 - 12 below for each engine type sold (actual values
not shown as the information is proprietary). Generally speaking, the forecasts are higher
than the actual engines sold in the first one or two moths of the quarter, and then the reverse is
true at the end of the quarter.
Jan-05 Feb-05 Mar-05 Apr-05 May-05 Jun-05 Jul-05 Aug-05 Sep-05 Oct-05 Nov-05 Dec-05 Average
Figure 9: Commercial APUs Forecast versus Actual Shipments
Dec 2004 Forecast for 2005 versus Actual 2005 shipments
CP Actual -CP 12/4/2004
Figure 10: Commercial Propulsion Engines Forecast versus Actual Shipments
Dec 2004 Forecast for 2006 versus Actual 2005 shipments
w CAPU Actual - CAPU 12/4/2004
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Figure 11: Military APU Forecast versus Actual Shipmentsf
Dec 2004 Forecast for 2005 versus Actual 2005 shipments
Helo Actual - Helo 12/4/2004
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Figure 12: Helicopter Forecast versus Actual Shipments
f Note that Military APUs and Helicopters are sold to military customers, and they are willing to receive engines
earlier than originally requested. That is one reason why the actual number of engines shipped is greater than the
forecast, and OTTR performance is good in Figure 2.
Interestingly, the average number of engines sold per month for both commercial
propulsion and commercial APUs are very close to the average engines per month in the
forecast. The problem is that the linearity of when the engines are built is atrocious. The last
month of the quarter has shipments much higher than other months, also as described in
Figure 2, and if the granularity were broken down by week, the last week of the month would
see more engines sold than the first few weeks.
Given that the forecast generated the year prior to the engine being built is on average
quite close to the actual shipments needed to be made each month, why is it that Honeywell
cannot seem to build engines with linearity, and the commercial propulsion engine OTTR is
suffering so badly?
To continue the investigation, consider the next item on the list of possible root
causes: Volume and Complexity. As was discussed previously, the comparison will examine
commercial engines versus commercial APUs. Since engines have - 6000 individual part
numbers, and APUs only - 2000, the complexity must be normalized out. Therefore, the data
presented will consider 1 engine to be equivalent to 3 APUs. There may be other ways to
normalize complexity, such as using number of suppliers or value of parts, but the volume of
part numbers was the method chosen for this analysis. Since each part has an individual part
number and quantity associated with it, and all parts must be assembled in some way, it was
determined that volume is a more accurate measure of manufacturing complexity than other
methods. Armed with normalized volume of engines versus APUs, the hypothesis being
tested is that more volume would lead to more potential for late deliveries. If this is true, then
the data should show that more (normalized) engines are being shipped than APUs.
Figure 13: Normalized Engine Shipments as a Percent of APU Shipments
The values show that when complexity is normalized out, there have indeed been
more engines shipped than APUs, with the exception of 2004. However, the actual amount
has not been much different until the forecasts for 2006, which ships over 4 times the amount
of engines as APUs. If complexity is indeed a factor in poor OTTR of commercial propulsion
engines, the data should show that OTTR is improved in the year 2004, where fewer engines
were shipped than APUs.
Looking at Figure 14 below, it is indeed the case that CP engine OTTR was better in
2004 than 2005, but it still was not as good as APU OTTR. However, looking at data from
2002, one can see that CP engines used to have "Very Good" OTTR performance. The
question remains, however, what changed since 2002 to so drastically affect OTTR?
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Figure 14: OTTR for 2002 - 2005
Following the tragedy of 9/11, the entire aerospace industry saw a marked downturn.
Honeywell's engine business was no exception. According to management at Honeywell,
2002 was a year of negative growth, resulting in the need to reduce the number of suppliers
for engines, as well as Honeywell employees in the engines area. As business began picking
up again in 2004 and 2005, Honeywell increased orders at qualified suppliers, and began to
re-qualify several suppliers for its engines business. Qualitatively, many suppliers could not
transition as quickly as Honeywell required, resulting in late shipments and poor quality. This
in turn has adversely affected OTTR.
Interestingly, however, is the observation that while CP engine OTTR performance
has drastically deteriorated since 2002, CAPU and the military business groups have not been
severely impacted. Quantitatively, one can plot monthly OTTR with monthly Year/Year
growth for both CP and CAPU, and, after removing 5 outliers, the former is statistically
significant, while the latter is not.
The following figures show the relative % OTTR versus % Year over Year Growth for
the past 4 years for both Commercial Propulsion engines and Commercial APUs. The scatter
plots of these data, along with their statistical analysis from JMP 5.1 ©TM, show that only for
CP does the % Year over Year Growth statistically affect the % OTTR. All data points
represent actual values, even points that appear to be outliers.
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Figure 15: Statistical Analysis of CP % OTTR versus % Year over Year Growth
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Figure 16: Statistical Analysis of CAPU % OTTR versus % Year over Year Growth
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This data shows that the t-statistics as well as the p-values are significant for CP %
Year over Year growth affecting % OTTR performance. The f-factor is also significant, and
the Rsquared value is reasonably high at 0.576. The Leverage plot shows that both the upper
and lower confidence intervals cross the horizontal line, which indicates that "the whole-
model F-test is significant."' 6 In other words, the x-variable does in fact affect the y-variable.
The Residuals plot also looks reasonable, with a generally random distribution, and no
noticeable trends. If the 5 outliers were re-inserted into the data, it would still be statistically
significant with a t-statistic of 2.89 for the x-variable, p-value and f-factor of 0.0058, and
Leverage Plot confidence intervals still crossing the horizontal line. The Rsquared decreases
to 0.157, but the residuals plot still looks random.
CAPU, on the other hand, is a much different story. The t-statistic for the x-variable is
less than 2 i, the p-value is 7% (greater than 5%, which is generally accepted as the cutoff
for statistically significant data), as is the f-factor. Rsquared is only 0.070, and the leverage
plot shows that the confidence intervals include the horizontal line, meaning that the data
cannot be considered statistically dissimilar from a horizontal line, and therefore the x-
variable does not affect the y-variable.
Growth as the Indicator
While this data is quite interesting, it is difficult to believe that growth alone caused
the problems for CP, but not for CAPU. There must be some underlying factors to why the
growth would result in poor performance for CP versus CAPU. A thorough analysis would
take into account many more variables for a multivariate statistical calculation. These
variables include: number of suppliers used over time, average number of parts shipped per
supplier (in single engine equivalents), % of part numbers single, dual, or multi-sourced,
average continuous length of time dealing with a supplier, average number of quality issues
per suppliers, % of suppliers requalified that month, average On Time Delivery % of all
suppliers, as well as number of Honeywell employees involved in planning, buying, and
coordinating for the engine type. Increase in growth is likely just the indicator that these other
factors will be affected, and they, in turn, directly affect the OTTR performance.
Unfortunately, much of this data is not readily available, so the continuing discussion
will have to be in qualitative terms. The next hypothesis for why OTTR is worse for CP than
CAPU can be qualitatively discussed using current values for the number of suppliers used for
both CP and CAPU. There is roughly three times the number of parts in an engine than an
APU, so it should stand to reason that there are more suppliers to deal with for engines.
For this analysis, Honeywell management suggested comparing a specific engine to a
specific APU. The BOM for each was exploded, which includes the supplier and part
numbers as well as quantity of parts required per engine. For the engine and APU considered,
there are indeed more suppliers for the engine than the APU. There are also some suppliers
that supply to both the engine and APU. The data, therefore, was broken out by number of
total suppliers, unique suppliers, and common suppliers.
Figure 17: Suppliers for Engine and APU
It can be seen that there are 29% more suppliers for the engine than the APU, and 55% more
unique suppliers. This begs the question, is there a difference in supplier performance
between the common and unique suppliers?
Data for On Time Delivery of parts was pulled for both the engine and the APU. The
parts were grouped by Common or Unique supplier. The parts were also classified by A, B,
or C designation. ABC classification generally refers to the level of importance a certain
piece of inventory has. Class A items are generally the top 5-10% worth of part value,
whereas Class B represents up to 50% of the value of all the parts. Class C items are then the
remaining 50% of parts value, and generally make up the largest segment by parts volume. In
this case, Honeywell designated the ABC classification, which does not always follow the
traditional method described here. However, judging from the values alone, this description
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does seem to match how Honeywell designated ABC parts. After splitting ABC segments,
average On Time Delivery performance was calculated for each group and engine versus
APU were compared. This comparison is shown in the exhibits below:
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Figure 18: On Time Delivery by A, B, C and Supplier for APU and Engine
This shows that the shared suppliers perform roughly the same in terms of on time delivery
for engines as APUs for all A, B, and C parts. The unique suppliers, on the other hand, are
quite different, performing 15-20% worse in terms of on time delivery to engines than APUs.
Since APU OTTR performance is very good and OTD performance for common suppliers is
the same between APU and engines, this thesis will make the assumption that the unique
suppliers to the engines are the primary root cause to poor engine OTTR performance.
At this point, a few assumptions must be made about the unique engine suppliers and
the parts they deliver. Because Honeywell does not save historical data on what specific parts
have caused engines to be delivered late, or whether the issues are quality or late delivery
reasons, I cannot determine with precision what the worst offending parts are. I can, however,
collect data on supplier on time delivery performance, and I will therefore assume that the
parts with the worst delivery performance are the ones that are causing the engine to be held
up. This may not always be true, certainly there could be cases where a generally high OTD
part is late and causes an engine to miss delivery schedule. There also may be several cases
of rejected parts requiring return and rework that cause engine lateness. In the absence of this
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data, however, I will assume that a large percentage of late engine deliveries are caused by the
latest parts delivered by the unique suppliers.
I also know that Honeywell designates A, B, and C parts and generally carries stock in
the C parts: washers, bolts, screws, etc. Again, while there may be times that a late or
misplaced C part could cause an engine delivery holdup, I will assume that enough stock is
carried that the C parts are not a usual suspect, and will discount them as the primary culprit.
This leads me to conclude that the worst offending parts are A and B parts from
unique engine suppliers that have very poor On Time Delivery historical performance (<
60%). With that in mind, I will turn my attention to means to improve OTTR performance of
Commercial Propulsion engines.
Inventory Management to the Rescue
In a perfect world, Honeywell would build a consistent number of engines every week.
Suppliers would ship high quality parts to Honeywell at a steady rate, and engines would be
assembled, tested, and delivered to customers on time. Clearly we do not live in a perfect
world.
In a world without time pressures and accurate forecasts, Honeywell would dig to the
root cause of every late delivery issue. They could help suppliers improve their capacity, and
they would have access to very early and accurate forecasts to ensure parts were delivered on
time. Unfortunately, the reality of business is that there is time pressure, forecasts are never
perfect.
This is not to say that Honeywell should not address their linearity issues, try to find
the root cause of late deliveries, or attempt to improve forecasting accuracy. Rather, this is to
say that until those things happen, "something's gotta give." Honeywell cannot expect to
deliver to its goals of nearly perfect OTTR with uncompromising quality by passively
refusing to compensate for short term challenges with flexible and strategic solutions.
One such solution is holding safety stock inventory for critical parts. Safety stock
(SS) is defined as:
SS = koL Equation 1
where
GL= ajlLT Equation 2
UL is the standard deviation over the lead time of the part. K is a safety factor based on the
Gaussian distribution. The value chosen for k is related to the percent of orders a company
wishes to be able to fill on time. LT is the lead time of the part, and or is the standard
deviation of the orders shipped over the period of time being considered. (Note: one must
take caution to ensure that al is in the same unit as the lead time - specifically, if orders per
month are being considered, lead time must be expressed in months.)
The safety factor, k, increases as the percent of orders to be fulfilled increases. This
is known as the "service level." Values of k for common service levels are shown below:
85% 1.04
90% 1.28
95% 1.65
99% 2.33
Figure 19: Service Level k Values
Given a certain service level, the amount of safety stock will increase. The chart below shows
safety stock as a function of the lead time for varying service levels. Note that the lead time
shown reflects supplier lead time for parts required to build an engine. Safety Stock values
are shown as a percentage of the average number of engines shipped per month, and the data
used is from 2005. Standard deviation is given by month to match lead time by month as a
percentage of the average number of engines shipped per month. The standard deviation
value for engines in 2005 is 39% of the average number of engines shipped per month.
Figure 20: Safety Stock as a Function of Lead Time by Service Level
It is plain to see that as lead time of parts increases, the amount needed to be held in
safety stock increases. This is because the safety stock must cover the fluctuation in order
shipments over the entire lead time of the part, up to the service level, in order not to stock out
and cause late deliveries. Engines have average part lead times around 60-80 working days
(3-3.5 months), but the range is anywhere from 15 to 350 days (0.5 to 17 months). If it is not
feasible to reduce the long lead time parts, a very good way of reducing the amount of safety
stock needed is to improve linearity. In other words, build a more consistent number of
engines each month, which will cause the standard deviation to decrease. The variation that
safety stock must cover over the lead time, therefore, is greatly reduced, resulting in less
safety stock inventory held overall. Figure 21 below illustrates just how drastically safety
stock can be reduced as standard deviation is reduced (i.e. linearity improves). Service level
in this case was kept constant at 90%.
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Figure 21: Safety Stock as a Function of Lead Time by Standard Deviation
Indeed, if standard deviation could be reduced from 39% to 20% of the average
number of engines shipped per month, safety stock is reduced by almost half. Indeed, it can
be seen in Exhibit S above that for a 90% Safety Stock level at the standard deviation of 39%,
over 100% of the average number of engines shipped per month must be held in safety stock
for lead times greater than 4 months. If the standard deviation is dropped to 20%, 100% of
the average number of engines shipped per month does not have to be held unless the lead
time is greater than 16 months - a 4x improvement! If linearity can be improved even further
to just 10%, then Honeywell would never have to hold more than 50% of the average number
of engines shipped per month even for long lead time parts.
Another interesting point is that contractually, Honeywell customers are required to
fix their Purchase Orders 90 working days (-4.5 months) before their requested shipment
date. If Honeywell could improve linearity to 20% of the average number of engines shipped
per month, then they would only have to hold a fraction of the long lead time parts in
inventory. They could even break down those parts by supplier on time delivery
performance.
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At first glance, while holding safety stock inventory may make sense for on time
delivery performance, it seems like it would increase overall cost of inventory, and therefore
be financially undesirable. After all, not only will Honeywell be holding the inventory for
engines being built, but it will also be holding a fraction of engine parts at all times. This
must mean that inventory on hand will go up, as will cost of inventory on Honeywell's
balance sheets!
Interestingly, however, this is not true. In fact, if the 80-20 rule of thumb holds true,
then 80% of the delays are caused by only 20% of the parts. This means that 80% of the parts
are available for an engine build, while Honeywell is waiting for 20% of them! Depending on
how long Honeywell waits for the other 20%, the original 80% is being held as inventory on
hand - and impacting the cost of inventory. One of Honeywell's highest volume engines,
Engine X shown in Figure 22, illustrates how this could be true.
Engine X is, on average, 15 days late from the original customer request date to when
the engine is shipped:g
Engine X Average Days Late -Not Including Shipping Days
20.
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5
Figure 22: Engine X Average Days Late to Customer Request
This means that some parts are holding up Engine X for over two weeks, but it is likely that
the majority of the engine parts are in on time, and now being held. Ideally, inventory on
Note: this is in calendar days, not weekdays. 15 days is 2 weeks 1 day.
Average = 15 days late
Range = 9-21 days late
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hand would be only the engine's worth during the time it is being built. However, when some
parts are over two weeks late, a large fraction of those parts are being held for an additional
15 days. If the 80/20 rule holds true, 80% of the engine is being held for an additional 15
days over and above the 100% being held for the time it takes to build an engine. I can use a
simple model to show how this will affect inventory on hand.
I will assume that 80% of the parts required to build an engine always arrive the same
week that Honeywell should build and ship the engine. I will also assume that the remaining
20% of the parts always arrive the week that Honeywell actually does build and ship the
engine. Therefore, Honeywell is holding 80% of the parts for the time it is waiting on the
remaining parts. I also assume that in an ideal world, Honeywell holds only the inventory
required to build the engines that it should ship that week. When Honeywell is waiting for
parts, it holds 80% of the parts while waiting for the final 20%, then it holds the entire 100%
for the week it actually ships the engine.
For example, in Week 1 Honeywell is supposed to ship one engine. They actually
ship no engines, however, and they hold 80% of the parts that week. In Week 2, Honeywell is
supposed to ship 4 engines. They actually ship none that week either, and end up holding
80% of the one engine from the first week, as well as 80% of the 4 engines from the second
week. In Week 3, Honeywell is supposed to ship two engines, but they only ship one.
Therefore, they hold 80% of 6 engines, and 100% of the one engine that they actually shipped
that week. This continues for the sample of 25 engines shown over a 13 week period below.
For the model, these 13 weeks were taken as a stand-alone time period. I did not
consider the engines in queue before that period of time, nor did I consider the engines that
were supposed to be shipped after the 25 engines that were used in the model. While the
inventory on hand in the model ends with zero, in reality, both the first and last week of the
model would have higher values than are shown in Figure 23.
Figure 23: Inventory On Hand 80/20 Model
The model shows that in an ideal world, Honeywell should be carrying inventory only
for the engines that they ship each week, and for Engine X, this number is on average 2
engines' worth (standard deviation 1.4). However, using real data for when these 25 engines
were requested to ship, and actually did ship, I see that Honeywell ends up holding 5.5
engines worth of parts at all times (standard deviation 2.9). This is assuming, again, that the
80/20 rule holds at Honeywell.
Now let me assume that Honeywell is going to hold safety stock with a 90% service
level. Remembering Equations 1 and 2 above, I will again make some assumptions. I know
that the standard deviation is 2.9, but I do not know with precision the lead time of the 20% of
the parts that are causing the delay. I know the range of lead times for the parts is 1-18
months with an average of 4.5 months. However, I will be conservative and assume that the
parts that are holding us up probably have a longer lead time than the average, so I will double
it and use 9 months. I will also now use the standard deviation of the ideal case, since when
Honeywell holds safety stock they should be able to ship the ideal number of engines each
month. This equates to holding approximately 5 engines' worth of the problem parts at all
times. However, since the problem parts only equate to 20% of the parts, I will assume that
this is only valued at -1 engine worth of value.
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When doing this, I now assume that Honeywell is constantly holding 1 engine worth
of value plus the engines Honeywell should ship for the week. When I plot this against the
ideal (no inventory) and actual (80% engine hold up until late parts come in) cases, I am not
surprised to see that it shows up in the middle of the two:
Figure 24: Inventory On Hand 80/20 Model with Safety Stock
Indeed, now Honeywell is only holding 3 engines on average, just one more than it was
holding in the ideal case! By holding critical inventory (20% of parts) only, Honeywell has
successfully reduced average Inventory on Hand, and therefore the average cost of inventory.
The simple 80/20 model effectively illustrates how holding critical inventory can help
reduce overall inventory on hand, but it does not necessarily help Honeywell in their tactical
endeavors to determine which parts need to be held. In order to do that, Honeywell must look
at the entire enterprise and filter out efforts for the parts that will have the greatest impact on
the cost. This will be covered in greater detail in the Recommendations chapter.
Summary
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate how the Honeywell Engines Product Center
should look at the entire supply chain and optimize at a macroscopic level. The data suggests
that periods of growth in Commercial Propulsion engines results in declining On Time to
Request performance. Several factors most likely contribute to this, but the most notable one
is supplier performance. Holding strategic inventory until supplier performance can be
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improved would allow Honeywell to buffer against late part delivery, and still deliver on time
to its customers. Not all suppliers are under performers, however, and only a subset of new
engine suppliers needs to be considered when selecting candidates for safety stock inventory.
This chapter outlined how, in general, unique suppliers for engines (not also supplying APUs)
tend to under perform in general. These suppliers could be evaluated on their historical on
time performance in A and B level parts to determine what inventory should be held. Once
the parts for safety stock have been chosen, Honeywell can use the safety stock formulas
given in Equations 1&2 to select the quantity of parts to hold. As was illustrated in the
models shown above, holding even 20% of the parts by value would reduce overall inventory
by nearly 50%, and would provide on time engine delivery to customers.
CHAPTER FOUR: Turboprop Engine Assembly Layout Project
Honeywell is currently experiencing a growth period, as was discussed in the
Introduction. One specific area that has been impacted by this growth is the turboprop engine
(TPE) line. The engine itself has been in production since 1965, and was a major player in
Honeywell's sales for several decades. 17 As newer engines came online, customers gradually
shifted to those, and requests for new TPE engines had slowed down to just a few engines per
year for the last few years. Since the demand was so small, until Q3 of 2005 there were only
two workbenches designated for TPE assembly, and they were frequently used for various
other miscellaneous tasks as well. However, a surge of new TPE engine orders placed for the
2006 calendar year required that an entire area of the assembly floor was allocated for
production.
Figure 25: TPE 331 Series 10 Engine
Realizing that adequate floor space must be allocated to the TPE 331 line, Honeywell
Engine Assembly and Test decided to rearrange the build space for another of its assembly
lines, the turbofan engine (TFE). By moving the TFE area, ostensibly as a "Green Belt"
project designed to improve the flow of the assembly line, Honeywell could free up space for
the TPE. Layout of the TPE line was also considered a Green Belt project, and team members
of both projects were sent to the Six Sigma Plus Green Belt training class in July - August of
2005.
Having participated in the Green Belt class, and successfully completing the
requirements for Green Belt certification on December 8, 2005, I feel that I can speak to both
the positive aspects as well as the opportunities for improvement in Honeywell's Green Belt
process. The concept of having Six Sigma Plus (including lean) training for all employees,
specifically hourly employees at the Green Belt level, shows that Honeywell is dedicated to
the cause of lean, and certainly has taken steps in the right direction to establish a lean
mentality among its entire workforce. However, the way lean is taught in the Green Belt class
is very local, and the ideas of lean enterprise are not introduced in a manner comprehensible
by the students.
Specifically, lean tools are taught in Green Belt class. These include Thought Process
Mapping, Value Stream Mapping, Cause and Effect Analysis, Process Maps, Failure Mode
Effect Analysis, Statistical Process Control, Design of Experiments, To-Be State, Reality
State, and 5S. However, the rationale behind using these tools is not discussed in depth.
Furthermore, the way lean can impact the entire organization is not presented, nor are the very
real problems in supply chain that impact the efforts of lean at the assembly/test level. Green
Belt projects must be signed off by a financial supervisor, but generally that person is not
consulted until the majority of the project's work is completed. This does not allow the
financial supervisor to help guide the activities of the project and ensure that it really does
improve the bottom line - or at least remain neutral towards it.
Another issue with the Green Belt course is that many of the hourly employees do not
seem to have bought in to what is in it for them. In fact, during the course of planning the
layout for the TPE engine, one mechanic on the team observed that years ago the layout was
done the way that we were again proposing to do it. Specifically, that we wanted to build the
engine in a modular fashion such that all the modules would be built at the back build stand in
a line over the course of a few days, then mate to the main engine build that would begin a
shift or two later in the front build stand in a line. The old way was to build all the modules
first, set them aside, then start the engine and finally mate the parts together. Allowing for
flexible modular flow would reduce overall build time, and allow the engine to build to flow
down the line. As the team discussed the merits of the modular flow line, the mechanic
commented, "It used to be set up that way, but the lean people came in and messed it up." To
which another mechanic replied "Well, we're going to un-lean it!"
A few mechanics on the TPE Green Belt team repeatedly told me throughout the
project planning phase that the TPE build area had changed several times over the past few
decades. One mechanic in particular claimed injustice, saying "they have always taken the
TPE space, and we always get stuck in a corner. We can lay out what we want, but they're
just going to take it again." The "they" he was referring to was a combination of management
and lean "Black Belt" project managers. According to him, "we," naturally, are the mechanics
who build the engine. The statements he made help to illustrate a typical "us-they" dichotomy
among mechanics and management. Although there is certainly a good business reason to
restrict the build space of a TPE engine whose demand is dwindling in favor of providing
space for popular engines, this line of reasoning was not explained clearly to the hourly
workforce. Others on the team voiced the same concerns, though most had more of a
lackadaisical attitude about it. One mechanic said "just give us some space, and we'll get it
done." He did not seem to care precisely where or why the TPE line was being moved, but
felt confident in the mechanics' abilities to build engines.
Despite the mechanics' constant assurances that they had seen these "lean move
attempts" before, and regardless of where they were told to work, they would be able to build
the engine, it was very difficult to track down documentation of prior work. There is a shared
drive designated for Green Belt projects, but I found the availability of past documentation to
be found there to be quite unsatisfactory. While there was a spreadsheet with a graphic
depicting the current ("As-Is") state of the TPE build stations, there was no explanation as to
why it had been set up in that manner. Furthermore, there was no explanation for why the
TFE area was set up the way it was, and the entire green belt teams for both projects were
forced to re-invent the wheel in terms of determining the best course of action for the new
layouts. Perhaps an objective team could eek out of the current state what was working and
what was not, but especially in the case of the TPE, there was so little volume, that the engine
build was not done systematically, or by the same people each time. Plus, the space allotted
was so small, that really no tools or hardware was easily found when a build started, and most
of the team members had nothing positive to say about the current state of affairs. This may
have been different in the TFE area, but from the outside, it seemed that the problem there
was to convince people that a new flow process for building the engine was the right thing to
do. Without having any rationale for the current means to either accept or refute, however,
the team members seemed to rely on the idea from their management that the change was the
right thing to do. This lack of documentation of data or rationale is similar to major problem
seen in the supply chain area, and will be highlighted again in the test area. It seems to be a
trend at Honeywell that long term electronic data storage and recovery is an area where
considerable improvement could be made.
Not being privy to some of the financial data around the new TPE project highlighted
other issues. Some mechanics felt that the resurging demand for TPEs meant 100% pure
profit for Honeywell on any engines sold. They reasoned that the engineering work was done,
the bill of materials was known, all Honeywell had to do was have them build the engine, and
the cash would just flow straight to the bottom line. They also heard the engineer in charge of
purchasing say that he had plenty of money left in his annual budget. Therefore, they wanted
to buy new items for the Assembly lines. We did receive new A-frame carts to hang tooling
on, as well as a new overhead H-beam hoist replaced in our area where it had been previously
removed. But they wanted new cabinets, new workbenches, new build stands, and new
computers. I explained that we would design our "To Be" ideal state for our layout, and then
we would work with the TFE team that was moving to get the other things that we needed.
We did not need to spend money on this engine line just because the engineering and design
work was done! However, it was not until I started using an analogy that meant something to
them that they responded. No one had bothered to explain that reducing costs helps the
company earn net income - and that was a good thing for them.
The analogy I used was for their personal household budgets. I asked them if they
generally allocated a certain amount of money each month to groceries, dining out, clothes,
entertainment, etc. They said yes, or at least saw how that was reasonable. Then I asked
them what they did if they didn't spend as much one month on clothes. Did that mean that
they should spend more the next month on clothes to make up the difference? Or did they
want to save that money to spend later on something big, like a nice vacation, or a new car?
They said of course they would save the money; if they didn't need the clothes there was no
reason to spend it now.
After they acknowledged that they would save the money, I told them that was how
companies work, but on a much larger scale. If there is money allocated to a budget that does
not need to be spent, then that money goes back to the company's bottom line. It helps the
company improve its cash flows, and ultimately improves stock price and dividends to
shareholders. The money, essentially, could be saved for another use that would be a greater
benefit than to spend it on new workbenches or cabinets, when there were perfectly usable
"leftover" benches and cabinets that we could use. This rang a bell with the mechanics, and
the grumbling about new things gradually subsided. It certainly helped that our area ended up
getting almost exactly what we wanted, one cabinet shy, but several computers more, so the
mechanics felt satisfied with the result.
The lesson for Honeywell is that while they are doing the right things by holding Six
Sigma Plus Green Belt training classes, making sure that hourly employees hear about Lean
and Six Sigma tools, and requiring them to use the tools on a real project, they could really
improve the program by using Lean Enterprise thinking. The fifth principle described in
Lean Enterprise Value is directly applicable in this discussion of how to best use the
workforce to improve lean activities at a corporation. "People, Not Just Processes, Effectuate
Lean Value." Specifically, the book claims that "full application of this fifth principle would
involve creating mechanisms to maximize the ability of all people in a defined enterprise to
understand and help effectuate lean value." Later, the book describes that "though it is not as
widely appreciated as other aspects of lean, all leading lean operations are characterized by
long-term partnerships designed to support knowledge-generating activities." 14
Honeywell should ensure that its workforce understands the "why" of using Six Sigma
Plus (lean) principles, and the new initiative "Honeywell Operating System" (HOS). The Six
Sigma Plus Green Belt class, which currently trains employees on a variety of tools to use for
lean and Six Sigma, would be an ideal place to begin this rationale training. Honeywell
management should also communicate regularly to its workforce why certain changes are
being made, what the vision and value stream is for the organization, and how the
management is trying to improve it. They should also call out active Green Belt projects and
describe why these projects are important to Honeywell Assembly and Test as an enterprise,
and encourage the Green Belt teams and all employees to work in the spirit of continuous
improvement. Honeywell Assembly and Test management holds quarterly Town Hall
meetings, which would be an ideal place to discuss these issues. Generally, no more than
three or four Green Belt projects are active at any given time, so it would not take too long to
incorporate those activities and successes into the Town Hall.
Summary
Honeywell uses a Six Sigma Plus@ methodology to combine Six Sigma and Lean principles,
and offers Green Belt training to employees. Arranging the TPE 331 Assembly layout was
assigned to a team of employees as their Green Belt certification project. As part of this team,
I found that there were many benefits to the Green Belt training, as well as many
opportunities to improve. While it is helpful that all employees have the opportunity to train
in basic Six Sigma and Lean principles, I felt that the principles were explained more as tools
rather than a change in work philosophy. Many hourly employees are not bought into the
practice of Lean because they do not see what is in it for them. Managers have the challenge
of consistently communicating lean principles, as well as acting as role models. Once
executive level support is realized, the most effective way to really change the culture of an
organization to truly believe in both the principle and practice of lean is to achieve buy-in at
the lowest levels of the organization.
CHAPTER FIVE: HTF7000 Electronic Test Aid (Turbo TI)
Project
Another project requiring significant philosophical change at the grass roots level of
Honeywell Engines is the creation and implementation of an electronic form of engine Test
Instructions, or TIs. Although this project was not specified as a Green Belt project, similar
managerial practices are needed to successfully implement this project. Again, the electronic
TI is a paradigm shift for the hourly employees, and requires clear and consistent
communication by management to ensure that everyone understands the need and significance
of the project. Another similarity to implementing Lean is that the electronic TI needed to be
embraced by the lowest levels of the organization in order to be successful.
As was true in both the supply chain and Assembly Layout chapters, the issue of non-
electronic documentation lingers at Honeywell in the engine test area as well. The aerospace
industry is tightly regulated by the Federal Avionics Administration (FAA), and ensuring
compliance with safety and quality standards is of the utmost importance. Consequently, it is
difficult to transition from a long standing tradition of using paper documentation of Test
Instructions to qualify an engine. The paper TIs, have been approved by the FAA, and any
change to the mode of documenting engine tests would require review and approval by the
appropriate channels.
This is not to say that Honeywell has not been subjected to many of the same pressures
that other industries are for transition of information electronically, rather than via hard copy.
In fact, several of Honeywell's customers are beginning to request electronic files of engine
tests, rather than the ream of paperwork that is currently being sent to them along with their
engine. In an attempt to remedy this situation, Honeywell has undertaken an effort to create
an "Electronic Test Aid" (ETA). This aid does not seek to immediately override the paper TI,
but rather to enhance the ability of the technician to perform standardized tests, ensure that all
required test data is recorded automatically, and to reduce the human variation that can lead to
subjectivity in recorded data and/or failure to recognize a problem until the lengthy
performance test has completed, thereby requiring the repetition of the entire test.
The Electronic Test Aid was a new venture, and one that required much preparation
work in addition to the actual development of the tool itself. As the project manager, I
endeavored to instill many Lean Enterprise principles into the entire course of the endeavor.
The engine selection for the first ETA was carefully calculated - using the newest engine in
the Honeywell fleet, the HTF7000. The HTF7000 was chosen in that the customer,
Bombardier, had begun to request electronic test information, but also because the paper TI
was in a state of revision, which matched the timing for including a new means aiding the test
such as the ETA. In order to comply with FAA standards, the paper TI, being the final
authorization on the engine test, would have to refer to the Electronic Test Aid as an approved
standardized method of monitoring control parameters during testing and automatically
collecting test information. It also will provide an electronic log sheet for recording sales
data, which can be printed at any time for convenience, but also can be saved in a database for
future reference. Therefore, choosing a new engine whose TI was involved in an intense
review and transformation process, allowed for a smooth transition to incorporate the new
ETA test method.
DMAIC: Define
Lean seeks to add value by eliminating waste. The DMAIC process was used for the
Electronic Test Aid project in order to identify the best process for implementing the project,
as well to systematically define value and highlight waste that could be eliminated. DMAIC
stands for Define, Measure, Analyze, Improve and Control, and is a standard way to approach
a new project, used by both the Honeywell Six Sigma® methodology, as well as by other
companies and lean processes.
Current state, defects through waste and undesired effects, future state and
Define roadmap
Measure Cost/quantities of causes of waste
Analyze Identify key leverage points and project opportunities
Improve Ready organization for change
Control Project plan and contract for change, set basis for control
Figure 26: DMAIC Philosophy of Project Management per Honeywell Six Sigma@
While it is clear that every challenge cannot be anticipated in the Define stage, it is
also imperative to set a clear vision for what the project will and will not seek to do. The
Define stage also helps identify key stakeholders and boundaries for the project. The
following items have been highlighted as areas for improvement with the Electronic Test Aid
project:
Figure 27: Define Stage of DMAIC per Honeywell Six Sigma@
Defining the problems in the current test process helped the stakeholders to understand
the rationale for why the project was being undertaken in the first place. The project's main
goals are to standardize testing and ensuring the integrity of tests with consistent
instrumentation. Secondary goals were to save time during testing due to confusion across
shift changes, and searching through documents for tables or charts. Another benefit to
management is to have a clear snapshot of time taken per test by technician. This could
generate an average time for performing each test, and help determine where there was time
to be saved in the process by improving or reducing test requirements.
Stakeholder Analysis
Another piece of the Define stage was the Stakeholder Analysis. All stakeholders
were plotted on two charts. The first plotted "Success of the Project" on the y-axis versus
"Level of Help Needed" on the x-axis. The second plotted "Success of the Project" on the y-
axis versus "Level of Buy in Needed." The Success was based on a qualitative estimate of
how much that stakeholder's contribution would affect the final project's outcome.
Specifically, if a particular stakeholder only needed to help a small amount, and that only
helped the project to be successful in nominal terms, that stakeholder would be plotted in the
lower left hand quadrant. However, if a small amount of help would contribute to a high
success rate, it would be plotted on the upper left hand quadrant. Similarly, ifa particular
stakeholder had to help a lot, but that was not necessarily an indication that the project would
DEFINE
Defects:
Non-standard prep tests.
Non-standard order of performance tests.
Passing tests when instrumentation is flickering on/off.
Time wasted flipping through paper TI for tests, charts, reference documents.
Time wasted due to confusion at shift change.
be very successful, they would be plotted at the lower right hand quadrant. Finally, if a
stakeholder had to help a lot, and this directly resulted in a high degree of success for the
project, that stakeholder was put in the upper right hand quadrant. This methodology holds
true for the level of buy in needed as well. The difference between help needed and buy in
needed is that help is objectively furthering the project towards completion, but buy in
attempts to evaluate how much each stakeholder must believe in and promote the project in
order for it to truly be successful. For example, Software Programming Engineers had to help
a lot for the project to be successful, but since they were not the final users, a high level of
buy in from them was not critical to the ultimate success of the project.
Below are the two Stakeholder Analyses for Success of the Project versus Help
Needed and Buy In Needed:
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Figure 28: Success of the Project versus Level of Help Needed
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Figure 29: Success of the Project versus Buy in Needed
These two charts provide insight into the necessary contribution for each stakeholder.
Charting the Stakeholder Analysis in this way allowed me as Project Manager to determine
how much to work with various groups and to what level of detail I needed to involve them in
the project. Specifically:
* Assembly Test Manager - Medium level of help needed, high buy in needed for high
success: I needed to ensure this person knew what the project was, and bought into it.
This person is responsible for staffing this project both for the first engine, as well as
future implementations.
* Test Manager - Medium level of help needed for medium success, but high buy in
needed for high success. The Test Manager initiated the project, but is not directly
responsible for head count. Although his buy in is needed to ensure that everyone in
Test uses the new Electronic Test Aid, staffing is not dependent on him, so less help is
actually needed.
* Software Manager - The Software Manager actually has very little to do with the
project's success at all. While this person manages the time and overall software
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resources available for the project, the Test area holds final authority of prioritization
of projects. The Software team works for the Test area, and as customers, the Test
area sets the priorities for work, not the software manager.
* Software Programming Engineers - High level of help needed, but only medium
level of buy in. Again, since the Software team works for the Test area, they need to
help a lot to get the project done, but really have very little buy in necessary for a
successful project. While medium buy in would help to ensure the project is
completed on time and in a high quality fashion, the Software team is required to do
the work for their customers as part of their job. (Ironically, since the Software team
did do most of the hard coding work, their buy in was very high - they saw this as a
"pet" project, and worked extra hours and from home to see it get done.)
* Test Engineers - Medium-high level of help needed, but high buy in. These people did
not do much coding, but they did help to ensure that the documentation was correct,
and they are responsible for ensuring that testing is done properly. Therefore, their
help was needed to ensure high quality of the Electronic Test Aid. They also set
direction for the test, so if they want the ETA to be used, that is what will be done,
regardless of how the actual test technicians feel about it.
* Performance Engineers - Medium level of help and medium-high level of buy in.
These engineers set the requirements for the Performance Tests, which are the tests
that "sell" the engine. Since the ETA was to validate instrumentation checks during
each individual Performance test, they needed to help ensure the code was correct for
the checks, as well as buy in and trust the ETA to accurately determine whether
instruments were within tolerance. While the ETA could be done without checking
these things, reverting to the old method of waiting until all Performance tests were
done before knowing if they passed, it would save about 1 hour of time for the
Performance engineer to trust the ETA (because the PE would manually check
instrumentation performance after test completion).
* Technicians/Shift Supervisors - A Medium amount of help was needed from
Technicians. Since they were the ones who would actually use the Electronic Test
Aid, their input was very helpful to ensure a "user-friendly" test. A High level of buy
in was needed from them, but that would only ensure a Medium level of success for
the project, as their say was not the ultimate one for whether the ETA would be used -
only whether it would be used without complaints.
* TIDocument Control - Since the ETA did not replace the TI, this group of
stakeholders was not highly critical to the project. A small amount of help was needed
when updating the TI documentation to match the printouts that the Tutorial would
generate, but really the Document Control group had no say over whether or not the
ETA would be used, and their buy in was not critical at all.
* FederalAviation Administration (FAA) - A small amount of help and buy in was
needed, though this is a deceptive measure. The FAA could possibly break the entire
project by disapproving of it, but since they approved, there was really not much they
could do to help or improve success with their buy in. Since the TI itself was not
being replaced, their approval was more of a blessing than a true sanction.
The surprises in this group were that the FAA did not have much say over the project, nor
did the Document Control people. However, the Test engineers ended up with a lot of power,
as did the Assembly Test manager. Also, once it was determined that management and the
test engineers would mandate whether the Electronic Test Aid was used or not, Technician
and Supervisor buy in did not necessarily mean the ETA would not be used.
In addition to the Stakeholder Analysis, another chart was done to identify potential
challenges with completing the project. The "Actual Level of Concernh'i each group had for
the project was plotted against the "Level of Concern Needed" from them to see if there were
any stakeholders that were not very concerned about the project, but needed to be in order for
the project to be successful. Whereas the other analyses looked at the required states, this one
looked' at the reality state. The biggest challenges as illustrated below were the Test
Technicians and Supervisors. While some people were concerned with the project, as a whole
they were closer to low than high on the concern scale, which presented a challenge. Their
high level of buy in and help was desired for success and overall good feelings for the project
(though not necessary for actually using the ETA).
h "Concern" in this case refers to the level of interest in the project succeeding.
Stakeholder Analysis:
Identify Challenges
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Figure 30: Actual Level of Concern versus Level of Concern Needed
This discovery highlights an underlying theme that was also realized in the LESAT
survey. Many technicians or hourly employees come to work just to get a paycheck, and they
do not necessarily feel a great sense of responsibility for technological advancements in their
jobs. In fact, many technicians voiced concern that the Electronic Test Aid was the first step
to replacing human workers in favor of a fully automated test system. I tried to ease their
concerns whenever possible, saying that the intention of the ETA was to reduce human error,
improve quality of tests, but not to take the place of the person. Indeed, Honeywell uses some
test techniques that literally require a person to physically manipulate the engine for certain
tests, and all that hardware would have to be replaced - at considerable cost - in order to fully
automate a test. I explained that Honeywell had other areas of their enterprise that warranted
more effort and expenditure to improve delivery to customers than the final engine test.
Specifically, the supply chain parts issues needed to be resolved before spending a lot of
money on saving a few thousand in the test area would make any sense. By that time, most of
the test technicians would likely be retired.
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Still, people can be very skeptical of change. Anecdotally, it seemed that the
technicians with more computer experience (from home, personal life, etc) were more
comfortable with the Electronic Test Aid than those who did not use a computer very often.
Fortunately for me, the technicians certified on the HTF7000 engine were generally more
computer savvy than the entire technician body, but when Honeywell rolls the ETA out to
other engine lines, they will probably encounter this issue. The best way around the natural
skepticism for change is to ensure project champions, engineers, and managers verbally
support the ETA, and provide adequate training and a clear channel for feedback for
technicians. In order to lay the groundwork for these suggestions in the future, I built in a
feedback field to the ETA for common users, and have trained two Project Champions, one
for each day and night shift, to ensure that the project is successful in the future.
DMAIC: Measure and Analyze
In the Measure and Analyze stage, a Cost-Benefit Analysis was done on the project.
However, it focused mainly on time spent and saved and not quantitatively on actual dollars
saved due to improved test quality and reduced need to repeat tests. The actual dollar amount
that could be saved is difficult to know measure. This is because Honeywell has an excellent
quality track record. Engines very rarely are shipped to the customer with a quality issue
resulting from an overlooked failed or shoddy test. However, a few engines have been
recalled from the Shipping area for this reason, and several engines have tests repeated while
still in the test cell. No one tracks this data, however, and technicians would be hesitant to
even acknowledge a ballpark figure for repeat tests, not to mention how long it takes them to
do so. Therefore, the savings were estimated in raw amounts of time spent on things like
flipping through the TI, having to manually validate instrumentation values from completed
performance tests, and in general filling out lengthy paperwork that will now be automated.
Time spent was calculated using estimates from software coders who had done similar
projects before. The time required to write the requirements document, write the software,
validate, implement, and train technicians was considered. It was also assumed that this time
would be spent consecutively, so time in years may not reflect actual elapsed time due to the
other responsibilities of those performing the tasks.
Three different scenarios were assumed. There was the 100% Control scenario, where
the Electronic Test Aid would be fully automated with the instrumentation values during the
test. The ETA would pull in all required values from all tests run as well as validate
instrumentation limits during these tests, and no manual entry would be necessary at all. Due
to the drastic increased coding this effort would take, the time was highest for this scenario.
The next scenario was to automate only the Sales Tests. Most of the test is spent in
preparing the engine for the Sales, or Performance Tests. However, the engine is "sold" only
to the Performance tests, therefore these are the most important to ensure compliance with
instrumentation requirements, and entered values. This would require significant effort only
in the Performance section, and would therefore not take nearly as long as the 100% Control
scenario.
The final consideration would be a "No Control" scenario where the Electronic Test
Aid would merely serve as a reference document, and all test information would be manually
entered. This would be quite easy to do, but was not desirable, since the main savings for the
ETA would be in automating the Performance tests and ensuring that everyone followed the
same standard procedure and compliance for these tests.
Total estimated time for preparing the ETA was determined based on engineering
estimates, and the time was divided by six, as the project timeline was six months. This
provided a number of hours per month for working on the Test Aid. The time was assumed to
be comprised of work done by software coders, myself, and any miscellaneous engineering
help required. Time for training was included in month seven, which is also the first month
that benefits were estimated to be realized. From thereon after, only the benefits were
realized, and the cumulative time for the project decreases steadily until it breaks even
approximately a year and three months after the original project began.
Years
Figure 31: Cost Benefit Analysis Curve for Electronic Test Aid
Although the 100% With Control Electronic Test Aid saves the most time ultimately,
it also takes so much more time up front that the amount it saves was not considered being
worth the initial effort. Plus, after the initial effort was made, improving the code would be
relatively effortless, since the framework for the project would have been set. In fact,
management at Honeywell would like to see this effort implemented across all engine lines
eventually. Software engineering estimates for the second and Electronic Test Aid were a
quarter of the time estimated for the first ETA, with the potential to reduce even more.
Another Measure/Analysis done was technical in terms of the software coding that
would be used for the Electronic Test Aid. After the requirements were written, the two
software engineers were debating between using PERL/TK and a Web-based HTML solution.
Software coders liked PERL/TK for its flexibility, saying that it could be used to more easily
code more complicated requirements. However, they also pointed out that the benefits of the
web-based system would be that stakeholders could view the test from anywhere, and not
necessarily have to physically be in the test cell. A web-based system could also be more
user-friendly and intuitive, which would go a long way towards the success of the project with
the technicians who actually would have to use it.
- 100% wlCntl - Sales Tests -No Control -- Current
41 l~
2000
S1000
0
X 0
. -1000
S-2000
S-3000
-4000
-mnnI
A team of software coders and expert advisers met to discuss the merits and cons of
each type of code for each requirement. Forty requirements were assigned a priority value
based on the following distribution:
10 - Critical (Make or Break)
7 - Without it, ETA would lose 80% of its value
4 - Would really help
1 - Would help, but not absolutely necessary
0.5 - Nice to Have
The requirements were listed in a spreadsheet, and "effort," on a scale of 1-5 with 5
being the most difficult, was assigned to each item for both coding in PERL/TK or HTML.
The results were plotted out both individually as effort versus priority, and cumulatively by
adding the effort scores. The results of these two analyses are shown below:
Piodity
Figure 32: Effort Versus Priority of Electronic Test Aid Requirements by Software
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Figure 33: Cumulative Effort Electronic Test Aid Requirements by Software Code
The results show the PERL/TK code favoring the web-based solution by
approximately eight effort points. Eight points is approximately 4% of the total effort
required by either code, and was not considered terribly significant. However, one High (10)
priority item stuck out as being very difficult to do in PERL/TK: Graphics. The team decided
that for the sake of user-friendliness and comprehension, graphics was a more important
feature than even the priority of 10 could give it, and the web-based HTML solution was
decided on by consensus as the code to use for the Electronic Test Aid'.
After determining which solution to use, the team set out to code the software and
begin testing. This proved to take a longer time span than was ideally considered, because the
software engineers involved still had other responsibilities aside from the Electronic Test Aid,
and could not devote 100% of their time to the project. More will be discussed about this type
of matrixed authority and leadership challenge for a Project Manager in the Leadership
Challenges chapter of this thesis.
'Another note on the web-based solution is that I could more easily learn HTML, and help with the actual
coding, than I could learn PERL/TK. While this was not a deciding factor, it certainly helped sway the software
engineers in charge of the coding.
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The Electronic Test Aid coding was completed during my internship despite an
additional unanticipated challenge. I anticipated finishing the project by December of 2005,
but the principle software engineer had three weeks of vacation left in 2005 that he had to
"use or lose." Therefore, he was out of the office from December 8 through the end of the
year. The team also decided to implement the Electronic Test Aid with the newest revision of
the Test Instructions, and this was scheduled for release in mid-late January. The coding did
not finish until mid-January when I left. However, the program had not been implemented as
of March, 2006 due to the new TI revision not being completed before then. In order to
ensure a smooth implementation when the time was right, I trained two "Project Champions:"
one engineer on day shift, and one Level Four technician on night shift. It is my
recommendation that the night shift technician be made Project Manager of future Electronic
Test Aid implementations and to overcome challenges therein.
The difficulty in coding future Electronic Test Aids is not estimated in the software
challenges, but rather in documentation and management. Many Test Instructions have small
errors in them which would undermine the use of software. Software would force the user to
maintain instruments in certain limits, as well as to record passing test criteria, and if that has
changed in a "tribal knowledge" manner that does not reflect the true state of the test, it must
be remedied prior to the Electronic Test Aid's creation. Also, a Program Manager with
proper accountability and authority would need to be appointed or hired to oversee the
creation of future Electronic Test Aids. This person would help ensure the TIs were revised
by engineering with technician input. The PM would work with the software coders to ensure
the ETA complied with the TI. The PM also takes responsibility for training new technicians,
whether it is personally or via delegation. Finally, the Program Manager would be
responsible for the quality and integrity of the Electronic Test Aid, maintaining an Actions
Required list for any bugs or features for future implementation and improvement. This
person should be able to work with several technical experts (engineers, technicians, software
developers) and be organized and disciplined to follow up with tasks. This person does not
need to be proficient with any particular engine TI language or testing techniques, nor does
the person have to know how to code software, but s/he should be able to interface with
people in all these areas with confidence and ease.
Summary
The Electronic Test Aid, while itself not a huge time saver in the overall cycle time of
an engine's production, is strategic in three ways. First, it will help Honeywell ensure a high
quality test that will minimize human error and result in higher performance of test
technicians. Second, it will allow Honeywell to meet customer requests for electronic engine
test results. Finally, in the spirit of open communication and timely feedback, it will allow
stakeholders involved in engine test a quick, web-based means to view how far along a certain
engine's test is, what the results are in real time for quick troubleshooting and evaluation, and
the opportunity for future improvement based on data driven results and test times. All
together, the Electronic Test Aid is a win-win situation.
CHAPTER SIX: Tactical and Strategic Mix in Lean Enterprise
Lean Enterprise dictates that the projects described in the preceding chapters: Supply
Chain/Inventory Management, Engine Assembly Layout, and Electronic Test Aids, do not
exist in silos. Rather, they are all an integral part of the overall enterprise fabric, and should
be treated as interdependent upon each other.
Value Stream Map Discussion
The best way to envision how all the pieces fit together is to take a deeper look at the
Value Stream Map from Chapter One:
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Figure 3: High Level Engine Value Stream Map
Boxes shaded darker represent the value add steps to the customer. The dotted lines
illustrate information flow, including when someone looks something up on a computer. The
solid lines represent manual flow, including both physical material and manual input into a
system or a phone call to disseminate information.
The value stream is initiated by the customer and ends with the customer. In between
there, however, there are several steps and sources of potential breakdowns. For example,
customers can provide electronic orders to Honeywell, but they also deal with personnel.
Customers place orders with the Honeywell Contracts office, and do not have access to the
Material Production System (MPS). Contracts are required to enter items into the MPS, and if
there is a delay in doing this, or customer contracts change, the entire downstream supply
chain will be affected.
Engine Planners and parts Buyers then look at MPS to get forecasts, and subsequently
place the orders with both internal and external suppliers. Internal suppliers have viewing
access to MPS, but generally will not start production for certain parts until the order is placed
by the buyer. This too puts a lot of pressure on buyers to be on top of orders, and not allow
any time delay before placing orders. Also, since some parts have lead times in excess of the
firm customer purchase order 90-day, timeline buyers will sometimes not place orders in time
for customer request dates to be met.
Once the orders are placed with both internal and external suppliers, they are supposed
to deliver parts on a "Just in Time" basis to the Assembly and Test Stores facility. If these
parts are late, or have a history of being late, a Coordinator will personally contact the
supplier to check up on the part. Coordinators utilize MPS data, but do not have the ability to
change it based on real time information from suppliers. The coordinator position typically is
a high pressure, fire-fighting tactical role at Honeywell. These people are always in the hot
seat because they are the ones ultimately responsible for parts getting to the Assembly facility.
Although it is not their fault if orders were not placed on time or if the suppliers had a raw
material issue, etc, they are still held accountable for these mistakes! Also, since there is no
historical trending of parts that held up actual engine builds, the coordinator must rely on
experience and anecdotal evidence that a supplier might not deliver on time, rather than
relying on empirical data. This makes it difficult for a new person coming into the role, as
s/he will have limited experience with suppliers, and no way of determining where the
potential problem areas will be.
The coordinator role is interesting for the other reason that it exists purely due to the
supply chain's inability to perform according to their "Just In Time" goals. The coordinator
can be a hero or a villain depending largely on how the cogs in the wheel have aligned months
before the engine is actually supposed to be built. If the process was executed efficiently, all
the parts arrive "just in time" with no issues and the coordinator looks great for having
delivered the engine parts on time. On the other hand, if the parts are late, it is the
coordinator's responsibility to expedite them until they arrive. Regardless, in a perfect world
where "Just in Time" inventory management worked well, the role of Coordinator would be
superfluous.
Assembly and Test Time
Once parts do arrive to the Assembly floor, it is only a matter of days before the
engine or APU is built, inspected, tested, sent through Final Out (final inspection), and
shipped. Indeed, Honeywell has done an incredible job at the actual engine assembly
timeline, averaging only 7 ± 2.7 days from the "Clear" date (all parts available for assembly)
through the engine Ship date. Given the average lead time of 60 days, a seven-day assembly
adds only 12% to the overall engine Lead Time. It should also be noted that sometimes
engines will start to be assembled before all the parts are available. In these cases, the build
time is artificially inflated due to waiting for late parts. If only engines that began assembly
after all parts are clear are considered, the average build time decreases by one day, and the
standard deviation decreases by 1.4 days to 6 ± 1.3 days. This would make the build only
10% of the average engine lead time. However, starting an engine build only after all parts
are clear happened only 35% of the time in a 25 engine sample size.
The range of build times between when an engine begins assembly prior to parts being
clear is also much greater than that when the engine begins assembly after parts are clear.
The former ranges from 4 to 14 days, and the latter from 4 to only 8 days. It is obvious that
beginning an engine build only after parts are clear is better for the engine's build times, but
equally as obvious that this practice is not always followed.
Furthermore, regardless of whether the engine is built before or after parts are clear,
the average days late is reduced by one from 15 ± 3.6 to 14 ± 3.2 days, and the range reduces
from 9 - 21 to 9 - 18 days late. The fact that engines are generally overdue by more days than
it actually takes to build them coupled the fact that the build time is only 10-12% of the
overall average engine lead time means the reason engines are late is because parts are
delivered late, and 90% of the opportunities for improvement lie in the supply chain, rather
than in the engine build.
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Figure 34: Engine Build Time and Average Days Late
Since the bulk of the opportunity to improve on time delivery stems from the value
stream, one could question why Honeywell bothers with improvement projects in the actual
Assembly and Test areas at all. Saving a few hours in assembly or test would only be a
fraction of the noise in the overall on time delivery performance of commercial propulsion
engines.
When looked at from an enterprise view, however, we can return to the value stream
and recognize that the greatest value add to customers arises in the assembly area. Also, in
the spirit of reducing the need for non-value add process steps such as inspection, test, and
final out, any improvement gained in these areas can lead to a reduction in the overall non-
value add overhead required to ship an engine. Finally, just because there are not significant
time savings to be gained in Assembly/Test, does not mean that Honeywell can afford to let
the assembly and test area slide. In order to improve the overall enterprise, Honeywell has to
build on the strengths it already has.
Creating an assembly layout for new engines that matches the existing lean layout of
the rest of the factory is part of maintaining the lean abilities in the Assembly area.
Upgrading engine tests to an electronic system that will reduce human error and improve
standard work is an improvement that will add customer value. Both of these projects,
however, should be undertaken with the attitude that the gains to be made are in quality
improvement, ensuring the integrity of engine build and tests, and will make the Assembly
and Test environment a better one for employees. They are not meant to improve overall On
Time to Request delivery performance, nor should they be considered as potential for
significant lead time reductions for the overall value stream. Even if the time for Assembly
and Test was a perfect zero, commercial propulsion engines would still be late to customer
request dates.
Instead of pushing for significant time improvements in the Assembly and Test areas,
Honeywell should use the data that is readily available from this area as indicators for
improvement in the enterprise. For example, OTTR is not a metric of how quickly Assembly
and Test gets engines out the door, but rather a direct reflection on the performance of
supplier on time delivery, and buyers to fulfill their responsibilities for getting parts to
Assembly on time. Productivity is not a measure of whether engines will be late, but rather is
a measure of the morale and energy of the workforce. 5S audits and Safety records drive a
culture of performance and help execute a safe and orderly status for the entire Engines
Product Center. However, thinking of 5S as a metric that can only be applied to the
manufacturing line is narrow minded. If the Contracts department, Buyers and Planners could
all standardize their methods of operation, likely there could be some significant savings in
the supply chain. Rather than forcing those people to perform redundant tasks, all doing
things differently on a tactical basis, productivity gains could be made by allowing standard
processes to dictate human intervention, and allowing the remainder of the workforce to deal
with strategic issues to improve long term processes, and reduce the fire-fighting role of the
Coordinators.
Coordinators too could generate processes to collect empirical data on supplier
performance over time rather than throwing out the data as soon as the part has been
delivered. In this way, they could prioritize their work according to facts, and not rely on
experience and perception to guide their daily activities. It would also reduce the pressure
they feel on a daily basis, mounting at the end of each month and quarter, and rising to
extreme levels at the end of a year. They could slow down, focus on improving the worst
performing suppliers, and perhaps even consider moving on to more strategic jobs as their
role becomes less necessary. Currently there are two Coordinators for Commercial
Propulsion engines, two for Commercial APUs, and three for both Military APUs and
Helicopters. Several coordinators have voiced anxiety that there are not enough of them to go
around, so the first thing that would happen if the overall process improved is that they would
be less overworked in their current roles. As time goes on, their roles will become
increasingly unnecessary, but they will also have learned to think strategically. They will
have gained new skills that will be valuable to the company in other areas, and will no longer
feel the obligation of remaining in the Coordinator role. While I have no concrete evidence
for this, personal experience tells me that when a person feels needed in his or her job, many
employees will feel apprehensive about leaving his or her peers in the lurch if he or she moves
on. The coordinators have been in their roles for decades; they have the experience that the
job requires. If they were to leave, the entire Assembly area would be shaken up and the fires
that the Coordinators put out on a daily basis would rage until a new person gained the
experience required to manage that job. A solution to this risk is to use standardized
processes, make data driven decisions, and use metrics to monitor these activites that are
visible to everyone involved. The next section discusses how to identify metrics drive true
value for the enterprise.
Metrics and the X-Matrix
In order to tie together the entire enterprise and meet the ultimate goals of OTTR and
high quality, Honeywell must track certain metrics. The X-Matrix was used to identify which
metrics Honeywell Assembly and Test currently uses, how those illustrate the organization's
strategic objectives as described by the Engines Product Center executives, as well as for the
entire Aerospace organization, how what key processes these metrics rely on, and how the
stakeholder values are represented in each process and objective. The X-Matrix was invented
by the Lean Aerospace Initiative, and is a visual representation of interactions between
Strategic Objectives, Metrics, Key Processes, and Stakeholder Values. The Strategic
Objectives and Key Processes should have direct measurements, and the Key Processes used
and Strategic Objectives set forth should reflect Stakeholder Values. Instructions on how to
use the X-Matrix are as follows 18 :
The intersecting quadrants represent potential interactions between a column and a
row. For each potential interaction, ask the question indicated for that quadrant:
(1) Strategic Objective vs. Metrics: Is this strategic objective measured by this metric?
(2) Metrics vs. Key Processes: Does this metric measure this?
(3) Key Processes vs. Stakeholder Values: Does this process contribute to delivery of
this stakeholder value?
(4) Stakeholder Values vs. Strategic Objectives: Is this stakeholder value represented
by this strategic objective?
The questions are asked to follow the relationships around the matrix in a counter-
clockwise direction. Indicate a strong, weak, or no interaction in the appropriate
square. The numbers on the outside of the grid indicate numbers of weak, strong, and
total interactions in the row or column they are next to.
The X-Matrix is a helpful tool for assessing the current state of an organization with respect to
metrics and values.
The X-Matrix visually depicts strong (blue or dark), weak (yellow of light), or no
(white) interactions between Strategic Objectives, Metrics, Key Processes, and Stakeholder
Values. The Strategic Objectives and Key Processes should have direct measurements, and
the Key Processes used and Strategic Objectives set forth should reflect Stakeholder Values.
An assessment of Honeywell's metrics is presented in the X-Matrix shown in the figure
below.
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Figure 35: X-Matrix for Honeywell Engines Product Center
The bottom two Strategic Objectives shown in the X-Matrix for the Honeywell
Engines Product Center were told to me by the Vice President of the Integrated Supply Chain
in charge of the entire value stream to build engines and APUs. These are to improve engine
(APU) build linearity, and to meet customer OTTR. The other Strategic Objectives were
found in the reference guide from Rob Gillette (President and CEO of Honeywell Aerospace)
about the new reorganization of Aerospace. Gillette references these as the "Vital Goals" that
will help Aerospace fulfill its vision "To transform the world with Aerospace technology and
innovative people. "9
The numbers on the side of the chart show how many strong, weak, and non
interactions there are between the areas. Most of the Strategic Objectives have at least one
strong metric associated with them, except for the one that really tries to incorporate the Lean
Enterprise concept: Develop and Execute ONE Strategy for Aerospace. Perhaps there is a
metric at the corporate level, but I have not seen one in the Assembly and Test. Also, there is
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no strong metric tracking "Improve engine build linearity." Some individual managers track
engine shipments by week/month, but this is not among the standard 5 metrics shown around
the Assembly and Test area.
All the Key Processes have at least one strong metric associated with them: OTTR.
Customer On Time to Request is the biggest value for the Assembly and Test area. However,
even though this is tracked at a high level, it does not appear as though the message has sunk
in that all the key processes can be tied together via this metric. Assembly mechanics often
do not pay attention to this metric, and it is not even posted in the test cells. Also, the
pervading sentiment is that "we" in Assembly and Test were caused to be late because of
"them" the people in charge of the supply chain. In the Supply Chain, one manager stated
that "OTTR is a Site goal that is on everyone's Personal Objectives Review (POR) that works
in the Supply Chain. So we are all basically held accountable to some degree." However, it
is unclear to what extent individual groups are held accountable for poor OTTR performance,
since historical data tracking what late parts caused late delivery is not kept. Therefore, it
may be possible to reward everyone for good OTTR performance, but probably very difficult
to pinpoint who needs to improve when OTTR is sub-par.
The next evaluation deals with how the Stakeholder Values are represented in the Key
Processes. Although the entire Supply Chain has been lumped together (Value Stream Map
items prior to Stores) it can be seen that this process has a strong or weak interaction with all
of the Stakeholder Values. From a sense of accomplishment in all the work employees do to
customers receiving high quality engines on time, the Supply Chain initiates the entire
process. A strong Supply Chain is the foundation for a strong organization, and one that all
employees can build on for a sense of pride, morale, and continuous improvement.
The last evaluation is how the Stakeholder Values are represented in the Strategic
Objectives. Again, Honeywell looks very good here with all objectives strongly representing
at least one value. The only one of concern is the objective for reducing costs. Upper
management cares most about meeting customer request dates, so while there is a weak
interaction with cost reduction, there is not a strong push towards this. Interestingly, the only
strong interaction here is in the "Want to be Lean" value, but in that case, I believe that
Honeywell employees see the traditional Lean as "lean manufacturing, just in time inventory,
hold no safety stock," not as Lean Enterprise where it is better to hold critical inventory for
the sake of the entire enterprise, which will in turn reduce overall inventory costs. My
assessment is that because upper management does not necessarily consider reducing costs as
a very high priority, and they do not realize the link between lean and lean enterprise, that this
objective will not be fulfilled by Honeywell following the current path that it is on.
Something has to drastically change in order for the objective of reducing costs to be
prioritized and inserted into the stakeholder values. Again, this thesis points to how holding
critical safety stock inventory will reduce overall inventory costs, improve customer On Time
to Request delivery, and ultimately deliver more value to all stakeholders.
Further recommendations stemming from the insight provided in the X-Matrix will be
discussed in the Recommendations chapter nine.
Summary
When assessing how the strategic supply chain and inventory management issues fit
into the tactical Assembly and Test projects, it is helpful to look at Honeywell Engines'
enterprise level Value Stream Map. The depiction of the entire value stream illustrates that
upstream issues can severely affect downstream performance. Late parts affect Assembly and
Test OTTR performance, but Assembly and Test has no control over the upstream root cause
to the problem. Then when Assembly and Test undertake their own strategic quality and
efficiency improvement projects, they get trampled by the boom and bust fire-fighting
activities that must take place just to do business. In the meantime, employees cannot sustain
a high level of performance all the time, so during downtimes, morale for working on
Assembly and Test projects tends to wane. One of the first steps Honeywell can take to
identify how the enterprise relies on various constituents is to fill out an X-Matrix and
determine whether stakeholders are aligned and being measured in areas that they can affect.
Then the organization can take steps to promote control over accountability metrics, such as
holding critical inventory to facilitate meeting OTTR goals. Focusing the Value Stream on a
consistent set of realizable goals will help deliver more value to all stakeholders.
CHAPTER SEVEN: LESAT Survey Results & Analysis
The LESAT survey described in Chapter Two was conducted by personally
interviewing twenty people in Assembly and Test, as well as executives at the Engines
Product Center level. Four executives were interviewed, six managers, five individual
contributors, and four hourly employees. The survey used can be seen in the Appendix, and
was a modified version of the Lean Aerospace Initiative's LESAT survey which can be found
at www.lean.mit.edu.
An overall analysis was done, using all twenty respondents in the final averages.
Next, each group was analyzed individually, and the results of each question and section were
charted. Variance and range were evaluated for all groups for each of the categories Current
State, Desired State, and Gap. Recall the LESAT scoring from Chapter Two:
1 Not doing, not aware
2 Aware, starting
3 Using, room for improvement
4 Very good, minor improvement
5 Perfect - could teach this!
Figure 5: Modified LESAT Survey Legend
The ranges given for each section represent the highest score minus the lowest. These are
inherently small since the scale is only 5 points long. However, considering that a 1 point
range represents a 20% discrepancy in responses, even a seemingly narrow range could have
significant impacts on how the organization views Lean Enterprise principles.
As was discussed in Chapter Two, recall that that this scoring was simplified for the
survey conducted at Honeywell. This was done in order to streamline the interview process,
and since all surveys were conducted in person, interviewees could ask questions in real time
about what their answers meant. The entire set of scoring based on descriptive capability
levels can be found on the LAI website in the Product section under LESAT.20
High Level LESAT Survey Results
In order of highest assessment of Current State to lowest:
1. Executive Management - Current State = 2.61; Variance = 0.35; Range = 1.11
2. Individual Contributors - Current State = 2.59; Variance = 0.76; Range = 1.89
3. Hourly Employees - Current State = 2.58; Variance = 0.69; Range = 1.45
4. Managers - Current State = 2.53; Variance = 0.64; Range = 1.92
Executive Summary:
* Overall Current State = 2.54; Variance = 0.68; Range = 2.68 (between
"Aware & Starting" and "Using, with much room for improvement.")
* Overall Desired State = 4.04 Variance = 0.36, Range = 2.09 ("Using, with
minor room for improvement.")
Executives:
* Highest opinion of the company in Strategy, how well Lean is being used (including
vision & executive commitment), what the Value Stream and Future Value Stream are
and that there is a good Continuous Improvement Process and all the lessons learned
lead to more success.
* Lowest opinion of Supply Chain Management and Manufacturing Capability. Second
lowest that there are Lean Enabling Tools in place.
Managers:
* Highest opinion of employee-level development of Lean Structure and Behavior,
thought highly of relationships, incentive alignment, and that there are lean change
agents to be found.
* Lowest opinion on Strategy, how well Lean is being used, what the Value Stream and
Future Value Stream is; exact opposite of Executives. Agreed with Executives low
opinions that there are Lean Enabling Tools in place, and with the low opinion of
Supply Chain Management and Manufacturing Capability
Individual Contributors:
High confidence in Lean Strategy, close to executives. High confidence in Supply
Chain and ability to produce product.
Lowest opinion on focusing on continuous improvement, lowest understanding of
Transition plan to Lean.
Hourly Employees:
* High opinion of Manufacturing Capability. Very High on Lean Process Enablers -
citing the "Method, Operation, & Tools" (MOT) online assembly instructions as a
common tool/database. Thought highly of flexible workforce. Felt that information
was exchanged when required.
* Low opinion of Supply Chain. Did not understand Lean Value Stream, current or
future, and transformation plans. Did not know how to pull required financial
information (this is significant for Green Belt work!). Scored a 1 on the Continuous
Improvement Process - many people said there USED to be a process (suggestion
box), but now they do not know if there is a process at all. Directly contrasts the
executives who thought there was a 3.1 level of Continuous Improvement Process.
General:
No one thought very highly of the Organizational Lean Enablers - except in the area
of Safety, which scored at a 3.7 overall, ranging from 3 to 4.
Individual Section Results
Next, each individual section will be analyzed. The figures below have a small
thumbnail chart representing the scores for each group. The furthest to the left (red) is for the
Executives, next (yellow) is the Middle Managers, third (green) is the Individual Contributors,
and finally the last on the right (blue) is for the Hourly employees. The scores will be
discussed, and comments that represented the sentiments of multiple employees are provided
to further illustrate the points made. Takeaways for each section include specific
recommendations to Honeywell Engines for improving the overall score for that section.
Main themes from the entire survey will be discussed with recommendations again in both the
Leadership and Recommendations chapter.
Enterprise Strategic Planning
The idea of enterprise strategic planning is the first one approached in the LESAT survey.
The results of these questions are shown below:
2Lean thinking is used in strategic planning process (new engine
marketing/sales, procurement, delivery commits, etc).
Focus for strategic planning is on customer value.
We leverage the "extended enterprise" (keep suppliers in the loop, use their
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Figure 36: LESAT Enterprise Strategic Planning Results
Many people in Assembly and Test felt that they were not part of the strategic
planning decision-making process, but that Senior Management should be using lean thinking
and customer focus at the enterprise level strategic planning process. Some individual
contributors thought that using lean and customer focus it should be perfect (Desired State =
5) because "that's your business plan" and "customers should be our number one concern."
Despite this, however, many non-executives were not sure how much focus was on the
customer in the strategic planning process. An hourly employee half-jokingly stated that "(he
doesn't) think we care about what the customer wants." Executives, on the other hand, did
not have so high an opinion of how well they were using lean in the strategic planning
process, but they were very clear that customers were their number one focus, giving it an
average of 3.5 (Using with medium room for improvement).
Interestingly, the ranges for the answers to this section were very wide for non-
executives. Executives only varied by 1.3 on average for the three questions, but managers,
individual contributors, and hourly employees varied by 2.0, 2.3, and 1.7, respectively.
Flagging ranges > 2, this shows that there is a lot of confusion about how lean is used in the
strategic planning process, especially in the middle areas of the company.
The biggest takeaways from this section are that Executives seem to have a better
grasp on customer focus, but really do not leverage lean enterprise thinking to improve
customer value when strategizing, and other employees are unclear about what is really going
I E
on. Everyone thinks, however, that this is an important area to improve on, with the desired
state of 4.1. Executives should live up to their employees' expectations of them, use lean
concepts like Stakeholder Mapping and collaborating with suppliers when planning for the
future, and communicate this to lower levels, along with the pledge that Honeywell plans with
customer value in mind.
Adopt Lean Paradigm
Adopting the Lean Paradigm assesses the organization's readiness to move towards
lean. The questions revolve around upper management, their understanding and commitment
to Lean, how well they have communicated a Lean Enterprise vision for the organization, and
whether there is a pervading sense of urgency that drives Lean. The results of these questions
are shown below:
"Lean" (Six Sigma Plus) education is provided for enterprise leaders.
Senior Management is committed to Lean/Six Sigma (both in words and
action).
There is a "Lean Enterprise" vision for this organization.
The organization feels a sense of urgency, which is a driving force for Lean/Six
Figure 37: LESAT Adopt Lean Paradigm Results
This section scored relatively high. Each group averaged at a 2.9 or above. Most
people felt that the enterprise leaders had gone through some sort of Lean, or Six Sigma Plus
at Honeywell, training, and that they were committed to Lean. However, only the Executives
had a good grasp on the vision for the organization, and they were also the ones who felt the
most urgent about lean. One manager joked that "if the sentence read 'The organization feels
a sense of urgency - period,' then it would score high." Many non-managers felt that
Honeywell verbally promoted Lean principles saying that their "intentions are very, very
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good," but that senior management needed to drive Lean from the top, and "not just pay lip
service."
Overall, Honeywell has done well in articulating the need for Lean, but could improve
on actively driving the vision throughout the organization. Employees should be able to recite
the Enterprise Vision mantra at any point in time. Ideas for how to do this are to create
posters with the vision and post them all over the organization - including in the restroom
stalls! Discuss the vision at every Town Hall and Business Update meeting. Make badge
cards for employees to wear with their ID badges that articulate the vision and major Strategic
Objectives (from the X-Matrix) for how the organization will achieve it. As a cross-industry
best practice, Intel Corporation has used the badge idea for employees to carry the vision and
corporate values with them wherever they go, and as an Intel employee, I could spout off the
vision on command.
Focus on Value Stream
Similar to the two sections prior, executives again averaged the highest opinion of the
current state in the Focus on the Value Stream section. However, this seems to be driven by
their understanding of the Future Value Stream, as they likely are the ones that work on this
type of strategy. No other group had a good idea of the Future Value Stream, and indeed,
many hourly employees were not even aware that it existed at all.
There is general understanding of the current value stream.
Enterprise Flow (single piece flow of material and information) is used (no
holdups for material or information).
There is a Future Value Stream in place to match the vision for the
organization.
Performance measures drive enterprise behavior to work towards Lean/Six
Figure 38: LESAT Focus on Value Stream Results
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The "single piece flow of material and information" question generated a lot of
response. One senior manager summarized it well saying, "The information is there to tell
you why you can't do the job." Everyone agreed that single piece flow of material was very
important. An individual contributor described single piece flow as "the crux" of the
organization saying, "All the other stuff goes out the window if we don't have linearity."
This comment refers to a theme that arises throughout the LESAT interview process. There is
a pervading sentiment in Honeywell Assembly and Test that the reason for all the problems in
the area stem from the supply chain and not getting parts on time. As I described in Chapter
Seven, however, while it is true that the biggest bang for the buck is in the supply chain, there
is no reason to cut all focus in manufacturing. There should be a way to let people know what
is happening, where the breakdowns occur in the value stream, but what they can do to
mitigate the problem as much as possible without pointing fingers or blaming a scapegoat.
One good way to do this is to improve the metrics used, and try to use them to drive
proactive behaviors. A Honeywell manager told me that although they use metrics, they
"tend to react rather than proact." Also, some question the metrics that are being used. One
executive said s/he does not think the performance metrics have been converted to support a
lean transformation. This comment supports the X-Matrix discussion in Chapter Six. The
metrics need to measure the root cause of the problem, and provide insight about the most
efficient means to resolve those issues. For example, tracking OTTR does not describe what
parts cause engines to be late, or how many days each engine is late, what parts hold it up the
longest, or which suppliers are repeat offenders. This is the type of data that could transform
the enterprise towards Lean, and would help floor workers to understand what parts they
should pay special attention to during build. Perhaps there is a way to expedite moving
certain parts to the floor, or a better handling method for parts that tend to be damaged in
transit, things that the build mechanics can actually do something about, rather than just
passively grumble about the entire state of affairs, but feel powerless to act.
Develop Lean Structure and Behavior
The longest single section in the LESAT survey, Develop Lean Structure and
Behavior was also one of the most varied. Each group thought the highest for at least one
question, and all but the manager group thought the lowest on at least one question as well.
ID Develop Lean
Structure and Behavior
Figure 39: LESAT Develop Lean Structure and Behavior Results
In terms of the enterprise organization, executives felt that it was organized pretty well, but
managers did not. This again could be remedied with more communication about why the
organization is structured the way it is, and honest solicitation for feedback on how it could be
improved.
A unique aspect of this section is the questions directed towards employee relations.
Do relationships foster a team atmosphere? Are employees empowered at the lowest levels to
make decisions? Do they bring up new ideas, and are they rewarded for that? Are there
inspirational people within the organization, at any level, that are advocates for lean thinking
to their peers? It may be natural for employees, both salaried individual contributors, and
hourly employees, to feel that their voice is not being heard, or that they are not empowered to
make decisions, but the stories that accompany these answers speak louder than the numbers
themselves. Almost everyone interviewed could give an example of one group "versus"
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Enterprise is organized to support value delivery to customers (OTTR w/high
quality).
Relationships are based on mutual trust (we-we, not us/they).
We have open and timely communication - information exchanged when
required.
Employees are empowered to make decisions at the lowest levels to achieve
value delivery to customers (OTTR w/high quality).
There is incentive alignment - rewarding behaviors we want.
Innovation is encouraged - people are not risk averse, rather calculated risks or
bringing up new ideas is encouraged and rewarded.
Lean change agents - inspiration and drivers of change - can be found and are
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another, implying that there is a general sense of mistrust within the Assembly and Test
organization. Managers spoke of Assembly and Test versus the suppliers. Even within
Honeywell, the Assembly and Test building resides on the opposite side of a train track as
some of the internal suppliers, and one manager described the dichotomy between "the north
and south side of the tracks." The Purchasing group is also located across the street from the
Assembly area, and one manager noted that this physical barrier allows Purchasing people to
not "feel the pain of the Assembly and Test area." Purchasers will push suppliers to get all
the parts here, but may not prioritize based on the actual parts that the Assembly floor needs.
The manager lamented the lack of any "closed loop communication."
Hourly employees who work on engines are a separate group from those who work on
APUs. One individual contributor noted that the "few (mechanics) trained on both have a
better mentality." Based on this comment, increasing the amount of cross training could be a
good way to promote more of a team feeling within groups.
The most concerning comments, however, revolved around the "horror stories" a few
non-managers shared about a few managers. One person talked about wanting to reward a
colleague for a job well done, but the manager "shot me down, said it was part of the person's
job description to do go above and beyond." The individual telling me this story confessed
that when it is that difficult to recognize employees for taking that extra step to do a great job,
people get discouraged and bad morale is the result. This concept was corroborated by
another non-manager who said that "you can be an awesome worker, but still be an average
worker here."
When people do not feel like they are being fairly rewarded for a job well done, they
tend to stop caring about their work. 21 "A ratio of four engaged employees to one disengaged
employee is where a company starts to see gains in productivity" says Curt Coffman, global
practice leader of employee and customer engagement consulting at Gallup and co-author of
First Break All the Rules: What the World's Greatest Managers Do Differently (Simon &
Schuster).22 In surveying many people, there were recurring comments about employees who
have "checked out." They are here for a paycheck, they do their job to get it, and they leave.
This is not to be confused with a lack of pride and quality in what they do. On the contrary,
as one employee stated, "everyone has a sense of pride, wants to do a good job and feels bad
if they do something wrong." However, when employees do not feel motivated to go above
and beyond, it hampers the continuous improvement process and inhibits people wanting to
ask questions and offer suggestions for improvement. This is unfortunate since in a Lean
Enterprise, people should feel comfortable asking questions, coming up with new ideas, and
being rewarded for those things.
Create and Refine Transformation Plan
The section about transforming to lean brought mixed results. Again, the strategic
question about the existence of a "Enterprise Level Lean Transformation Plan" generated high
marks from the executives, and low results from other employees. This is just one more
example of how improved communication on Lean strategies could improve the sense of
general awareness in the organization. Aside from this, however, most people felt that
Honeywell was doing a good job of committing resources for lean and providing education
around using lean principles.
Enterprise Level Lean Transformation plan in place, shows steps to fulfill lean
enterprise vision.
Commit resources for Lean improvements - part of their performance review.
Provide education and training for those expected to use Lean principles, give
Figure 40: LESAT Develop Lean Structure and Behavior Results
The comments in this area support an earlier comment about paying lip service to lean:
Manager: "Lean improvements are part ofperformance evaluations, but there are not
severe consequences for not doing it -you can let it slide if more important things
come up.
Manager: "Lean black belts only care about their project - checking things off. The
manager is the one who has to live with it if the engines don 't go out the door, so they
are not as incentivized to set up lean flow cells. "
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Individual Contributor: "Individual managers may have lean transformation plans,
but even if they have these plans, they don't necessarily track them. "
Individual Contributor: "Managers and lean people talk to and challenge us, but
never execute. "
Hourly Employee: "Our role models are leaving, they weren't therefor our Green
Belt project."
Hourly Employee: "Management tries to act as role models, but just don 'tfollow
through a lot of the time."
Hourly Employee: "There was green belt education, but it is not used as much and
there is no management help for it."
All of these comments describe how there is a lot of talk, but not a whole lot of action in the
area of lean. I believe the underlying reason for a lot of this is because managers in Assembly
and Test do not have any control over the supply chain, which is the biggest underlying
challenge they face when trying to set up a lean flow for assembly. However, managers have
been mandated to continue with Green Belt and other lean projects that may not really save
time or money, so they just go through the motions void of any enthusiasm and true support
for the projects.
Focus on Continuous Improvement
The section on the focus for continuous improvement highlighted the biggest
discrepancy between executives and hourly employees. When asked about a "Structured
Continuous Improvement process" where everyone knew the precise steps to take if they had
a great improvement idea, executives thought the Assembly and Test organization was "Using
it, with medium room for improvement (3.5)." Hourly employees, on the other hand, gave it a
consistent score of 1: "Not aware, not doing," with a variance and range of 0.
IG Focus on Continuous
Customer Improvement
Figure 41: LESAT Focus on Continuous Improvement Results
The fact that the hourly employees, those who should be providing improvement ideas all the
time, or at least should know how to do so, said they really had no clue, whereas executives
thought they really did underscores the need for improved communication both up and down
the hierarchy, as well as the need for executives to follow through with their requests with
direct actions and required measurements. Most people felt that the executives did a good job
of discussing lean goals in Town Halls or other meetings, and they figured that metrics were
being tracked and lessons learned were being captured, but when it came down to where the
ideas were being generated - it was clear that they were not coming from the grass roots of
the organization.
Many people described an outdated "Suggestion Box" system that used to be in effect.
Apparently the suggestions were responded to in a timely fashion, and people were
compensated anywhere from $50 to $5,000 for ideas, depending on how much money the
really saved the company. However, all the employees who brought up the old Suggestion
Box said that they did not know what happened to it, and it certainly was not in use now.
Structured Continuous Improvement process - everyone knows what steps to
take to get their ideas considered/implemented.
Monitoring Lean Progress - track metrics real time, everyone can see what the
Lean goals are, and where organization stands to them in real time.
Nurturing the process - executives are involved in Lean goals, know how
organization stands to Lean measurements, and discusses them openly.
Capturing Lessons learned - successes are captured and discussed, and
those involved are openly acknowledged (encourages further success).
Impacting enterprise strategic planning - results lead to more strategic
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In all fairness, the old Suggestion Box may not have been the most effective one to
implementing good continuous improvement ideas. However, the fact that no one knew the
proper method for how to get a good idea implemented means that lots of good ideas are
probably going by unnoticed. Honeywell could devise a step-by-step checklist of what to do
with an idea, even generate a simple form either online or in a sleeve tacked to a metrics
board that employees could fill out with ideas. They could have regular reviews of the ideas
with the employees - perhaps a standing meeting one day of the week from 2-3 so both shifts
could come, and another one at 6 am for grave shift, to discuss any new ideas. They could
assign a project owner, and task resources and management advisors to help the projects get
done, and reward the employee based on the actual savings to the company. Rewards do not
have to be merely financial. Many employees value added paid vacation time, gift certificates
to the Honeywell cafeteria, or other low-budget recognition. Honeywell should be creative
when thinking of rewards, and ask employees what types of rewards they would appreciate
having for good ideas.
Manage Supply Chain
The section scored the lowest of all sections on average (1.98 versus 2.03 for Focus on
the Value Stream, which was the second lowest). While this is not actually surprising, given
the previous discussions about late parts delivery, there are still a few insights in this area.
Define and develop supplier network - core competencies/goals are aligned
across entire supply network (i.e. on time delivery, high quality)
Optimize network-wide performance - How do suppliers perform to the shared
goals which ultimately lead to end customer value.
Foster innovation and knowledge-sharing throughout the supplier network:
incentivize suppliers to be innovative and transfer their technology to you and
Figure 42: LESAT Manage Supply Chain Results
Interestingly, the individual contributors scored the highest, perhaps because they are
neither building the engines, nor having to recruit the overtime to do so when parts come in at
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the last minute. Executives scored it the worst, probably because their entire world focuses on
meeting customer OTTR, and the supply chain is the biggest barrier to doing so. However,
executives did feel that knowledge was shared reasonably well across the supply chain,
meaning if a certain supplier had a best known method for manufacturing, shipping, or
capacity delivery, they would share that idea with Honeywell, who could then share it with
other suppliers to deliver a global win for the final customer. Managers did not think so
highly of that concept, and hourly employees felt it was virtually nonexistent.
One manager talked about suppliers having values of OTTR and cost, but not necessarily
quality. Even internal suppliers do not put first pass quality over outs. One manager gave the
following example:
"For example, mechanics at machine shops have to get certain number ofpieces out,
so they just focus on amount (drive OTTR), not quality. This causes escapes from (internal
suppliers). When things do escape, the quality person here finds it - since it is stamped
with the individual's ID. The quality is looked at "after the fact" - then the entry is put
into the quality log."
In another recent example, a shipment of 800 blades arrived at Honeywell, with >2/3 of them
defective. The supplier might have pushed to get the parts out on time, but certainly the
quality was not up to Honeywell's high standards.
Another manager thought said that s/he "(doesn't) think suppliers are aware of our
goals, we don't involve them at all. We're aware that we should, but we don't so they're not
aware." However, other managers say that "we shouldn't need to hold their hand, but we do."
Perhaps some Honeywell employees feel that sharing forecasts, learning capacity restraints,
and extending the supply chain knowledge bed to suppliers would be more than Honeywell is
required to do. Others seem to think that working intimately with suppliers is the only way
that Honeywell can expect any improvement.
Perhaps Honeywell could learn something from the way that Dell Inc. operates. In an
MIT thesis written in 2004 on "The Dell Operating Model," the author describes the
relationship between Dell and its suppliers. 23
* "Dell and its suppliers do share much real-time information.
* Dell and its suppliers are closely linked in other ways, such as close working
relationships between individuals to ensure continuity ofsupply.
* Dellpurchases most of its materials from a small number ofsuppliers. And those
suppliers have remained somewhat consistent over the years.
Dell awards most supply contracts on the basis ofprice, quality, and ability to ensure a
continuity of supply. The fact that Dell has had stable supplier relationships for years is a
testament to the aggressiveness of its main suppliers, not long-term commitments between the
companies."
Dell has been recognized as a leader for their strategic supply chain organization.24
Honeywell could do worse than to emulate Dell's practices in this area. While many
Honeywell parts do not require the volume that Dell does, Honeywell can still share real time
information, foster a close working relationship between employees, and attempt to keep a
stable base of suppliers that are consistently working to be the most cost effective in the field.
Cost effective suppliers will not only benefit Honeywell, but will improve the suppliers'
deliveries to other customers as well, so it is a win-win situation.
Produce Product
Inevitably, the people who build the product have a high opinion of manufacturing as
a strategic advantage. The interesting thing from this section is that the executives, on the
other hand, did not have that high of an opinion about manufacturing.
IHE Produce Product
Utilize production knowledge and capabilities for competitive advantage -
manufacturing capability is a strategic advantage.
Establish and maintain a Lean Production System -defect free production
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Figure 43: LESAT Produce Product Results
Based on Figure 34 showing Engine Build times, it would appear that Honeywell's
manufacturing capabilities are indeed a strategic advantage. If the mechanics, inspectors, and
test technicians could not build, inspect, test, and ship an engine in the 6-7 days they do, the
overall days late for an engine would vary even more. Indeed, give credit where credit is due:
Honeywell's Assembly and Test capabilities are indeed an advantage to the organization.
4.0
3.0
2.5
2.0
tO
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.52.0.
IS-.
The second question in this section surrounding the Lean Production System,
however, is justifiably lower. The previous discussion on quality of parts, incoming defects,
and the lack of material flow warrants the low scores for that section.
Lean Organizational Enablers
The Lean Organizational Enablers again carried a mix of themes. Employees in the
Assembly and Test area thought highly of tactical issues such as a flexible workforce.
Everyone thought very highly of the integration of environmental health and safety into
business. Information systems and tools varied based on the type of information required by
each group. The lowest scores showed up in the financial information section, especially with
respect to all stakeholders being able to access required information.
IliA Lean Organizational
Enablers
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Financial system supports Lean Transformation - there is financial info
associated with Lean ($ saved, $ spent on training, etc) ; all financial
personnel involved understand why it is needed.
Enterprise stakeholders pull required financial information - data is available on
request.
Propagate the Learning Organization - employees are flexible and can perform
various tasks as necessary.
Enable the Lean enterprise with information systems and tools - information
and knowledge flows smoothly, people can get it when they need it, no one
feels embarrassed or nervous about asking questions.
Integration of environmental protection, health and safety into business -
everyone understands "cleaner, healthier, safer" and it is practiced as well as
Figure 44: LESAT Lean Organizational Enablers Results
Hourly employees felt that the Manufacturing Operation and Tooling (MOT) web-based
system was a great information system that everyone could access and provided insight to the
work they were doing to add value to the customer. This certainly is true. However,
managers and executives felt that the information they needed regarding the ability to build
product on time was based on lagging indicators, and proactive information was not available.
Executives discussed plans for Honeywell to improve their informational systems, especially
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with respect to financial information, but not all areas of the business have heard the specifics
of this plan yet.
Lean Process Enablers
The last section in the LESAT survey discussed the Lean Process enablers. Here, it is
very apparent that lean manufacturing has been infused quite extensively onto the Assembly
and Test floor, and build/test instructions are very clear. Hourly employees scored process
standardization and common tools and systems quite high, even though they fell off in the
other groups for similar reasons to common information systems as described above.
Process Standardization -consistency and re-use (everyone does things the
same).
Common tools & systems - similar databases used, people can access from
wherever they go/whatever they do - provides insight to value stream.
Variation reduction - reduce uncertainty by reducing variation (build times,
Figure 45: LESAT Lean Process Enablers Results
The main area of concern in this section was that around variation reduction. Most people,
especially managers, felt that there was far too much variation in the system. Their
perspective was that of engine builds being pushed out to the end of the month, random
quality issues for each engine, miscellaneous problems found in test resulting in tear-down
and rebuilding of engines. There is no standard for historical data tracking in these sources of
variable data, so it is difficult to see whether the variation is large, driven by a few outliers, or
whether reality is not as bad as perception.
Collecting historical data would offer a monumental wealth of information to the
assembly and test floor to determine where the greatest source of potential improvement
exists within their sphere of influence. One Individual Contributor lamented the lack of a
common source for pulling data to do trend analysis, saying, "I want to do trend analysis with
(Microsoft*) Access type data. I think everyone should be able to. We want to communicate
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with data." Senior managers say that common databases are also on the horizon, as well as
common tools to access the data. This would be a significant step forward in Honeywell
using data driven decisions to improve its supply chain and linearity issues.
Summary
Executive Level/Senior Management has a good grasp on both what the major supply
chain problems are, and have ideas in place to fix them. The problem is, however, that this
has not been communicated to the people that it matters to the most - specifically the front
line managers in Assembly/Test. These are the people who are impacted by late delivery
problems from suppliers, and the ones who are in the hot seat for delivering engines on time
to customers. They need to know - and be able to pass down to the people who work for
them - specifically what is being done to address the issues, and what the metrics are that are
tracking improvement.
There are several projects in the works, according to senior management, that will
improve the situation for OTTR and data accessibility. There is also a plan to improve
incentive alignment and employee satisfaction planned for 2006. These are the types of issues
that employees should know about. Employees should also feel that their contributions are
generally appreciated, solicited, and at least considered with feedback, if not always acted
upon.
The best way to improve all these things is by increased communication. Executives
should communicate their plans for improvement to their managers, and on down. Managers
should communicate that they want to hear ideas from individual contributors and hourly
employees. Currently, the best forum for communication is the monthly Town Hall meetings
which all employees already attend. However, the time for this meeting does not span the
grave shift, so manager should set a time at least once per quarter to meet with those people -
possibly from 5:30-6:30 am, so day shift could arrive 30 minutes early and participate. That
same day, the regular Town Hall would be held from 2-3 pm and the day shift people who
attended in the morning would not have to come. This will also help the floor continue to
operate smoothly, and allow everyone to attend. In order to track their communication
effectiveness, automatic surveys can be sent out after Town Hall meetings. These surveys
will reiterate the main points of the meeting, and ask employees if they felt those ideas were
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communicated properly. There could even be multiple choice questions where employees
select the option that was actually communicated. Employees who score high on the surveys
could be rewarded with gift money to the cafeterias, or movie tickets. Managers who receive
high scores from employees can receive the same. Second level managers would also be able
to track the results of the surveys for tracking purposes as well as to help coach for improved
communication skills.
All groups should collaborate to set up a true Continuous Improvement Process and
communicate how to use it. A suggestion for this is to re-implement the Suggestion Box.
Instead of using a physical box for paper collections, put the form online. All employees go
online anyway for their work instructions, and to browse the web during breaks. The link
could be accessible from the work instructions home page, as well as the Aerospace home
page, and the Phoenix Labs (test help) home page. The fields would be automatically sent to
a database and the employee who had the suggestion would be required to type in either his or
her manager, or another manager that be better equipped to address that particular suggestion.
An automatic confirmation will be sent to the employee and manager on duty reminding
him/her what his/her suggestion was, and next steps will be listed. Managers and employees
will be set up to receive emails reminding them to follow up, and if certain steps are
completed, both people can receive small incentive awards, such as a small gift certificate to
the company cafeteria.
Executives must determine what metrics should be used to illustrate Lean
improvement, and post them around the plant, in the same locations that the current OTTR,
quality, and inventory measures are now posted (at least five places on the factory floor).
Senior management must talk about the Lean Vision, Value Stream and Future Value Stream
as well as candid discussions of metrics in Town Halls and staff meetings. Managers can send
personal emails to Green Belt teams when they've completed a project to let them know it
was appreciated. Honeywell should hold Team Building events that mingle different groups,
even from "the other side of the tracks." All of these things, coupled with a robust inventory
management system as described in Chapter Three, can help Honeywell be a better place to
work for all employees.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: Leadership Challenges
Leadership has been a theme throughout the thesis, but this chapter will seek to
consolidate the main points previously discussed, as well as to bring up new issues and
recommendations for change. There are two facets to this chapter. First: challenges faced by
the general Honeywell Engines leadership, and second: challenges faced by me as an intern in
this organization. Honeywell is certainly not unique in a variety of challenges facing it right
now. The aerospace as well as the automobile industries are facing a shortage of raw material
goods, and subsequent spike in price due to these supply shortages. Also, the challenge of
working in a low-volume, high-mix environment is one shared by many companies across
aerospace, and in many specialty machine shops worldwide. Finally, complexity and
inventory management is a challenge seen in almost all manufacturing companies, from the
shining stars of Toyota and Dell, to the most complicated small precision machine shop.
These are not the challenges that will be discussed in this chapter, as several of them have
been touched upon in previous chapters. The challenges described here will be with respect
to the Honeywell Engines culture, and the people working at that organization.
The average age of Honeywell Engines employees is in the mid forties25. Many
employees have worked at Honeywell for decades, several in the same job or area the whole
time. There is a general feeling of camaraderie, and the Assembly and Test groups make it a
point to have quarterly potlucks, cake and presents for retirees, and even put up a small
decorated Christmas tree over the winter holidays. It is not uncommon for employees to bring
in baked goods from home to share in the office or on the floor, and managers recognize
birthdays and employment milestones during business update meetings.
While this almost family-like atmosphere can foster trust and cooperation in the
workplace, it has its downsides as well. For example, middle managers who come from "the
outside" (usually another area of Honeywell outside Engines) are regarded with sincere
skepticism by the hourly and individual contributor workforce. Without a proven track
record, building trust can be difficult, and these managers tend to leave within a few years on
the job. Some hourly employees expressed their sincere mistrust in their new manager,
saying "What does (s/he) know? (S/He) has never worked in engines before." With this type
of sentiment at the grassroots level of the organization, middle managers have to work very
hard to establish trust and a good reputation. And though many middle managers have a
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better understanding of upper management's intentions, middle managers do not articulate
strong faith in the abilities of the upper level management. As was discussed in the LESAT
survey review, middle managers often bear the brunt of the responsibility for engines getting
out the door on time, but do not have any control over the incoming parts to the Assembly and
Test floor. They see upper management as having this control, but not experiencing enough
pain to do anything about it. This spirals into feelings of resentment and general frustration
with upper management.
In addition to the few middle managers that change positions every few years, upper
management tends to turnover fairly frequently. It seems like running the Engines Product
Center is a stepping stone to different parts of the organization, an "experience," if you will,
that rising managers should have before leading an entire division. The manager that was in
the Engines Vice President role during my tenure at Honeywell had only been there for a few
months when I arrived. The middle managers reporting to him were not used to his style, did
not understand his intentions, and carried on with "business as usual" despite his repeated
urgings to work more proactively to prevent non-linearity of engine builds resulting in a
pileup of engines and APUs being shipped at the end of each month or quarter. I was
fortunate to meet with this Vice President a few times over the course of my internship, and I
could sense the frustration he felt at not getting through to people. He said that he tried to
spend time at each of the sites he managed (he was in charge of not only Engine Assembly
and Test, but also several of the internal Honeywell Centers of Excellence that made parts for
engines). Despite his best efforts, however, I still got the impression that when he did walk
through the floor, the workers would change their behaviors to try to impress him.
Specifically, they would make sure they were constantly working and would not chat while
working the way they normally did. A suggestion for the Vice President that could help his
presence be innocuous and allow him to get a better feel for the true atmosphere of the factory
floor would be to park his car on the opposite side of the manufacturing floor from the
building he worked in. That way he would have to walk through the manufacturing area at
least twice a day, and people would eventually get used to his being there. He could even
stop to talk with managers and employees along the way, and eventually he would find out
who the unspoken leaders were. These are the people whose opinion really matters to their
peers whenever a change is being implemented. If the unspoken leaders are for the idea,
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pretty much everyone else will be too. If these people do not like a new idea, however, a
manager trying to implement will have a very difficult time getting buy in from the rest of the
employees.
Therein lies management's greatest challenge at Honeywell Engines: how to build
trust and confidence in your abilities in order to influence real change without having to spend
several years in the same role. While building trust and confidence is always a challenge for a
new manager, some corporate cultures exhibit a high turnover rate and employees are
accustomed to everyone shuffling positions frequently. Since team members tend to change
frequently, employees expect turnover, and are not as suspicious of new leadership.
However, at Honeywell where many employees literally spend their entire career in one area,
outsiders are not easily accepted - especially new leaders with grand notions of "change" and
"improvement." I get the sense that the managers who rotate through Assembly and Test for
the experience tend to get frustrated and leave, and the "lifers" stay and plod away at the same
old thing, so change is difficult to achieve.
I also found that change often takes a backseat to the tactical fire of the day. The
specific reason the TPE 331 layout move occurred on October 3, 2005 was that it was the first
week of the fourth quarter, and after the push to get engines out the door at the end of
September, there was a lull in activity at the beginning of October. Also, Performance Test
engineers have been working on a new test program that will automate a certain manual
calculation. Theses engineers have been ostensibly working on the same program for 18
months and have not yet implemented it. It was supposed to be finished by mid December,
2005, but got pushed out due to the volume of engines that needed to be shipped before the
end of the year. Finally, in March, 2006, the program was completed and the new TI revision
was released.
This constant willingness to put strategic improvement projects on hold for tactical
fires results in cyclical periods of intensity and relief. People work so hard at the end of the
month, quarter, and year to make Honeywell Engine delivery commits, that they are
exhausted at the beginning of the next month, quarter, or year. There is little energy left for
strategic planning, and even upper level managers succumb to the intense cycle. As an
"outsider on the inside,"26 I was largely unaffected by "end of the month/quarter/year"
pressures, which allowed me to view the flurry of activity for what it was: a failure to plan for
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inevitable (and predictable) parts shortages resulting in panic and high-intensity work to avoid
complete disaster. It is my opinion that Honeywell Engines needs to develop a "strategic
planning and implementation team" that can assess how best to move from the current
boom/bust cycle to a controlled, steady work flow, and not be dragged into chaos in the
meantime.
During my internship tenure, I was viewed as a temporary addition to the Honeywell
family. Also, not being a manager, I was regarded with less skepticism than many new
employees. This was highly beneficial to me, as I was able to engender trust with many
people that I worked with, and they felt comfortable confiding personal opinions about the
company to me. However, being an outsider, and one that was trying to change some very
established routines like transitioning from a paper to electronic Test Instruction, I still
encountered a high degree of resistance to change. It was obvious that some people in support
groups like Document Control thought I was going to "computerize them out of a job." They
were determined to fight my initiatives, to the point that I had to pull back and change my
project to an "Electronic Test Aid" rather than an "Electronic Test Instruction." The paper TI
remains firmly in place, and the Document Control group remains secure in their jobs.
I also made several recommendations to hold critical safety stock inventory to several
high level managers up to and including the Engines Vice President. Although my probing
was applauded at first - specifically when I suggested that I dig into the root cause of why
Commercial Propulsion Engines has very poor OTTR compared to Commercial APUs, my
final recommendation to hold critical safety stock was not immediately appreciated. I was
given a variety of excuses, typically that this would never work for us, suppliers could not
meet the current demand so how could they meet demand for safety stock, and how could
Honeywell consider itself "lean" if it held inventory? To each I responded that there were
references in the literature that this could work and why doesn't Honeywell just pilot it on one
engine first, that they could develop an incremental approach to collecting the safety stock
over a year's time or longer, and most importantly, that I was promoting lean enterprise, not
just lean in the sense of using all of Toyota's rules without considering how they will affect
the Honeywell enterprise.
Just as many employees were hesitant to accept the new Vice President and his call to
work harder to improve performance, the Vice President was hesitant to heed my suggestion
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to hold critical safety stock. I got the feeling that my ideas were too radical for immediate
comprehension and action, but I did hope to persuade a few key people to consider them. I
found my contacts in a few other Vice Presidents; people that were not immediately
responsible for Engine OTTR, but were indirectly responsible for inventory planning and had
the ear of the entire division manager. By the end of my internship I realized that immediate
action would be difficult to achieve, so I suggested further research in the form of future
Leaders for Manufacturing internships, and I am pleased to report that there will be at least
two internships focused on the area of supply chain planning for strategic improvement in the
next year at Honeywell Engines.
My experiences suggest that despite the lack of turnover in many positions, new
managers and leaders are needed in Honeywell Engines to bring fresh perspective and new
ideas to the organization for resolving the many technical issues facing the enterprise.
However, I believe that the most frustrating problems lie in the personal interactions and the
cultural barriers rather than the technical issues per say. Without venturing into psychology, I
will say that anecdotally this makes sense: matters of personal concern are always more heart-
wrenching than objective technical puzzles. People naturally want to be respected, liked, and
listened to. These new managers must be patient when looking for change. They cannot
expect change to occur over night. Upper level managers must also find or create roles for
people who are impervious to the daily tactical fires, and can focus on the big picture value
creation and resolving long term issues. Finally, a relatively fast way to engender trust would
be to utilize Management By Walking Around (MBWA): 27
In effect you are being yourself walking throughout the organization looking for
opportunities to make positive comments and/or receive input and feedback. This
approach allows you to see everything going on, and it allows you to listen
directly to the employees. It is especially effective in an organization with many
management layers. The approach permits all employees direct access to the boss
and frequently generates high levels ofspontaneous, creative synergy while
employees and the boss exchange ideas.
If a senior manager practiced MBWA a few times a month, more frequently when s/he first
arrives in the job, s/he would shortcut the usually time-consuming trust building period where
employees wait for results before deciding to trust a manager. Although this might take time
from the new manager's busy schedule, it will likely pay big dividends in the future, and could
help foster trust from employees and allow the manager to feel comfortable more quickly in
107
his/her new role. If the manager does this when s/he is very new in the role, s/he has the
added benefit of being able to ask many seemingly "obvious" questions without detracting
from his/her reputation. Most people willingly accept the explanation "I just got here, so I
don't know yet," when it really is true. Plus, the workforce will then feel like they are
providing useful information to the manager, and will feel important because of it. This will
engender a feeling of congeniality towards that manager, and those employees are more likely
to respond positively to future requests the manger may make.
At the risk of sounding cliche, it seems to me that the best way around the cultural
suspicions of new leadership and change at Honeywell is through it. Find out who the people
are up front, get to know them a little, listen to their concerns, and maintain communication
levels. Explain decisions with real data and in a timely fashion, and try to remain fair in all
cases. This may not have the happy effect of pleasing everyone all the time, but it should
guarantee some level of respect, and in a work environment, the latter is the more important
of the two.
Summary
In a word, communication best summarizes the strongest recommendation for
leadership change. However, communication is not a one way street. In fact, a large aspect
of communication that is often overlooked is the ability to listen carefully. And listening does
not mean hearing, but rather sincerely considering what the other has to say, asking probing
questions, and assessing the sentiment for true meaning versus frustration venting. This is by
no means an easy task, but managers who listen to all of their employees will find themes to
their concerns. Addressing these themes in a public forum such as Town Halls will guarantee
that employees will in turn listen because they came up with the ideas in the first place!
Another issue which may not be readily apparent, but nonetheless exists, is that often
times listening and communication burdens seem to inherently fall on management.
However, employees have a responsibility to both communicate and listen as well. If they do
neither of these things, they cannot expect their work environments to improve, and they
really have no justification for muttered complaints. Communication starts with management
promoting an open environment and valuing employee comments, and continues with
employees being open minded enough to share their ideas, but realize when a course of action
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is chosen by management that will benefit the company as a whole, regardless of whether it is
their own choice or not.
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CHAPTER NINE: Recommendations
There are five areas for recommendations based on this thesis:
I. Lean Enterprise
II. Supply Chain & Inventory Management
III. Assembly & Green Belt
IV. Test
V. Leadership
Each of these areas has been discussed in detail previously; therefore this chapter will serve as
a high level overview of these recommendations. Next, a discussion of how to implement
tactical suggestions in order to meet the strategic objectives will ensue, followed by a
suggested roadmap for the timeline of these initiatives.
Lean Enterprise
Honeywell needs to consider the entire Engines Value Stream Map. Gather a team of
experts from each area and map detailed processes for each. Determine breakdown points.
Brainstorm solutions for breakdowns, and insert communication links throughout the value
stream. Communicate the Honeywell Aerospace Vision and Strategic Objectives throughout
the Honeywell Engines organization. Hang posters with these messages on walls and doors
around the plant, and print badge cards that employees can wear with their name badges to
serve as a constant reminder of the extended enterprise goals. Develop a strategy for
improving the biggest problem area: On Time Delivery for Commercial Propulsion engines.
Communicate the steps to all employees in regular business update meetings. Establish
metrics that accurately reflect the strategic objectives, and set realistic goals for improvement
in time, and post them across the plant. Discuss progress and shortfalls openly at business
update meetings. If a goal is scrapped, communicate the rationale for this to all levels of the
enterprise in order to foster a sense of trust and follow-through.
Supply Chain & Inventory Management
First, gather a small "Strategic Planning and Implementation Team" of 5-6 people who
can be removed from the tactical pressures of getting engines out the door, and focus on the
big picture. Allow them to flesh out the Value Stream Map and write a Future Value Stream
Map to match the vision of the organization. Then, have them write a list of
recommendations for how to get to the future state, along with what teams should be involved
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with each step. At the same time, pilot a "critical safety stock" program for the HTF7000
engine. This same team can be involved with collecting historical data for the actual parts
that usually hold up engine builds. The team should set criteria for determining what parts to
hold safety stock in (i.e. >50% more than 1 day late in the last year, lead times in excess of 6
months, possibly different criteria based on price of the item). Then they can establish safety
stock quantities based on service level desired, standard deviation of forecast for the specific
engine, and lead times for each part. The team should also document what success will be
once the safety stock is available (i.e. OTTR improvement by 10% each month, etc).
Next, slowly accumulate parts to fill the safety stock. Have the team communicate
verbally with each supplier, perhaps even go on site trips for face to face meetings. Share
with them Honeywell's plan to hold critical safety stock inventory, and possibly work out a
joint ownership plan, whereby Honeywell will not be fully financially responsible for 100%
of the inventory. Ensure that all stakeholders have reached consensus on when the safety
stock parts are expected to be delivered, and be patient if the process takes up to one year.
In the mean time, prioritize which suppliers need help to improve capacity and quality
for their deliveries. Consult with them on how to improve their manufacturing, perhaps even
sending Honeywell Black Belt resources to work with them for periods of time. In this way,
the lead time and on time delivery issues can be improved, and safety stock will be reduced.
Once all the safety stock has arrived onsite for the HTF7000, establish a linear build
schedule. Even if customers do not require engines until the end of the month or quarter,
Honeywell should build according to a fixed and constant schedule, and take the hit in
finished goods holding costs in order to maintain that schedule. Honeywell can also work
with customers to ship product early in some cases, and perhaps work out an agreement for
partial ownership such that the inventory burden will not be solely held by either company.
After establishing this linear schedule with safety stock, monitor OTTR for at least 6 months.
Determine the impact of having safety stock, and revise levels as necessary. If the project is
considered successful according to the goals set at the beginning, begin the process on the
next engine model.
The ultimate goal should be to improve linearity of engine builds, thereby reducing the
forecast variation, and subsequently lowering the required level of safety stock. Also, if lead
times and delivery performance can be achieved by the suppliers, this too will reduce the need
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to hold inventory. However, there should be minimum performance criteria that all suppliers
must meet in order to not hold inventory from them. This must be tracked in real time such
that any slip in performance is noticed immediately and proactive steps can be taken to ensure
that engine delivery to customers does not slip due to supplier issues.
Once all engines are on the critical safety stock program, and goals are being met, the
team can turn to their future value stream and work on initiatives to create value and eliminate
waste. Possible project ideas are to allow supplier and customer insight into the MPS
planning schedule, as well as two way updates and communication within this program.
Honeywell could create a web-based tool for suppliers to input hypothetical orders and see
how that would affect the Honeywell supply chain, and when the orders could be delivered.
Suppliers could input updates in manufacturing schedules and delivery commits directly into
the MPS system, and another tool that would show how those schedule changes affect final
delivery to customers could be provided. Eventually, Honeywell could manage suppliers by
their impact on Honeywell's assembly schedule, and possibly offer incentives to suppliers
with bonuses to perform better, and penalize them if they adversely affect the schedule.
Honeywell could also offer incentives for customers to not change their orders, and
potentially even consider penalties for order changes within the 90 day contract policy
timeframe. This would have to be studied in order to ensure it would match industry
standards and not drive long term customers to competitors. Also, customers could become
frustrated if they are charged penalties for changing their orders, but Honeywell is not charged
when it delivers orders late. Honeywell could address this issue by offering a reciprocal
incentive: impose penalties for late PO changes, but also provide refunds or future discounts
for their own late deliveries.
All of these things will take time, but the key is to look at the entire enterprise, and do
what is best in order to achieve the ultimate goals of on time delivery of quality engines to
customers, and making money for the company.
Assembly and Green Belt
Assembly can improve the average build time by waiting for parts to be clear before
starting to build an engine. This will require discipline, and may only be possible after supply
chain changes, such as holding critical safety stock, have been implemented. The remaining
recommendations for improving the assembly area are again about communication.
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Mechanics should know that their work is appreciated, and their efforts do not go by
unnoticed. However, putting a lot of focus into taking time out of the assembly line will not
be value add until the bottle neck of parts delivery is resolved. In the mean time, the Green
Belt training could be improved, and small scale "improve the work environment" continuous
improvement projects could be initiated. First, all Green Belt teams should be required to
meet with their finance consultant at the beginning of the project. Second, all Green Belt
teams should have at least one member that is a manager or individual contributor with a desk
and computer to coordinate the group. Third, Green Belt training should begin with the
philosophy of Lean and Six Sigma, to discuss why they are done, not just what tools to use.
Consider a value stream mapping activity that each student takes home to do - mapping the
current and improved process for a regular activity such as grocery shopping or working on in
the yard. In class, when a tool is being discussed, include an activity that illustrates the point;
do not just gloss over these things - especially when teaching people that have little to no
exposure to the theories already.
Test
Recommendations for Assembly and Green Belt hold true for employees in Test. In
addition to that, however, Test is trying to update their technology for testing and tracking
results of engine tests. Once the pilot on the HTF7000 Electronic Test Aid is complete,
promote one of the champions to a Project Manager position. This person should coordinate
the efforts to prioritize which engines should be transitioned next, work with the engineers to
update TIs, direct the activities of software coders to implement the next Electronic Test Aid,
and train users as the ETAs roll out.
Leadership
While leadership should not be restricted to management, in the spirit of
organizational change, the recommendations will be targeted for middle and upper level
managers at Honeywell Engines. When choosing middle managers, Honeywell should
consider credibility as well as the need for experience, and when outsiders are brought in,
senior managers should coach them to manage by walking around and verbally support them
in front of the hourly employees in order to help build their credibility quickly. New middle
managers should remain patient and open to learning about the organization, and never
underestimate the power of gaining the respect of the workforce.
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Upper management must also manage by walking around, especially in the first few
months on a job. Patience is critical in these roles, because change is difficult to achieve in a
slow cycle-time industry like engines. Listen first, act next. Establish realistic goals and hold
teams accountable to them. Ask for data, and do not give up when it is not readily available.
Make decisions based on fact, and communicate the rationale for these decisions across all
levels of the organization. Plan to spend at least two, if not three or four, years in the role, and
focus on doing a great job for the organization, not just adding a notch to the experience
ladder for future career progression. Above all, remain optimistic and fair when dealing with
people, and allow them to get to know the personal as well as professional side of you. This
will serve to inspire the loyal workforce that makes up Honeywell Engines.
Merging Tactical and Strategic Projects
As was mentioned before, a good way to balance the tactical projects with the strategic
would be to set up a small 5-6 member "Strategic Planning and Implementation Team." I
recommend this team take the existing Vision and Strategic Goals set forth by the corporate
Aerospace level, add to that the two Engines goals of Linearity and OTTR, and start to work.
They can do the Value Stream mapping, both current and future state, as was discussed in
Section B of this chapter, and own the tactical issues of implementing a critical safety stock
inventory program for engines.
A key factor is to ensure buy-in and accountability. Although this team will be
relieved of the daily pressures facing the Engines Product Center, they will need help from
members throughout the organization to implement their ideas. Upper management must buy
into their activities, and sanction them verbally and often. As the old adage goes, "you have
to spend money to save money," and this team will certainly have to spend money up front
when acquiring their safety stock.
Next, metrics must be aligned such that the entire team responsible for the value
stream for a single engine is held accountable for its success. Historical data must be kept on
what the root cause for each OTTR miss is, and these causes should be collected into
categories, investigated, and fixed in order to avoid repeating the situation.
Linear assembly schedules should be set and adhered to. Again, holding finished
goods is desirable over cramming assembly and test into the last week of a month or quarter.
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Work with customers to determine if a flexible delivery plan can be implemented, or whether
they would be willing to share the cost of holding finished goods or accept early deliveries.
The ultimate strategic goal is control and executing to plans. Tactically, small steps
must be achieved one by one in order to make the strategic goal a reality.
Suggested Roadmap for Change
In order to provide suggested tactical activities required to complete the overall
strategic improvements of a lean enterprise, a timeline has been created. The timeline gives
activities by quarter for high level changes to be made to the Honeywell Engines area in order
to improve On Time To (Customer) Request for Commercial Propulsion engines. A three
year horizon was used given the level of change required. These are just general guidelines
for major change initiatives. They do not include the tactical initiatives that are already
underway in Assembly (Green Belt and Lean Manufacturing) and Test (Electronic Testing of
Engines). However, these activities should continue as part of the general Assembly and Test
continuous improvement plans. Since these are already being undertaken by management in
the Assembly and Test areas, they are not considered in the high-level timeline shown below:
1
2
3
4
5
Hire Strategic Planning and Implementation Team
Begin collecting data on root cause engine OTTR misses for all engines.
Post signs with Vision and Strategic Goals around plant.
Document Current and Future Value Stream.
Communicate to employees in Town Halls, Business Update meetings.
Generate badges with Vision, Goals, and Value Stream Maps for employees.
Establish Critical Safety Stock criteria and inventory levels based on desired Service
Level, standard deviation of forecast and lead times
Using 9 months of data, determine which parts to hold in safety stock for pilot engine
(HTF7000).
Begin meeting with suppliers to set timeline for how to accumulate safety stock.
Prioritize which suppliers to help improve capacity, delivery with Honeywell Black
Belt teams.
Communicate Safety Stock inventory management to employees. Describe metrics and
goals for improving OTTR.
Begin collecting Safety Stock from suppliers.
Set Linear schedule for engine builds, and try to meet schedule.
Track OTTR changes.
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8
9
10
11
12
Work with customers to accept finished engines early, negotiate financial terms.
Continue collecting Safety Stock, building to linear schedule, and tracking OTTR
changes.
Evaluate OTTR improvements and inventory levels for pilot engine.
Revise safety stock and inventory management plans as necessary.
Begin evaluating next engine parts issues for safety stock candidates.
Communicate results for OTTR and inventory level change (improvement) on pilot
engine to employees.
Discuss next engine(s) for implementation.
Begin working with suppliers for next engine safety stock implementation.
Repeat Quarter 5 & 6 activities for next engine.
Continue to re-evaluate Safety Stock levels, and begin roll-out to all engine models.
Continue communication to employees.
Consider areas for improved value add and waste elimination in the value stream.
Determine staffing levels for new value stream, and judge whether these levels can be
met by attrition or if people must be moved.
Continue to evaluate suppliers for safety stock criteria, and measure inventory levels.
Establish teams for new Value Stream and train employees.
Figure 46: Suggested Timeline for Lean Enterprise Improvement at Honeywell Engines
The activities listed in the timeline provide a guideline to Honeywell, or any other
manufacturing company seeking to improve its delivery performance. The generic version
would replace engine with "product." This timeline could also be modified for services or
solutions companies in the scenario of developing efficient processes in order to improve
enterprise level value to customers.
Summary
Optimizing an operation such as the procurement, assembly and test ofjet engines and
APUs is a complicated task. In order to meet high standards of quality and on-time delivery,
Honeywell, like other aerospace companies, must consider the entire value stream. The
philosophy of Lean Enterprise will serve well as Honeywell seeks to create value for its
stakeholders while eliminating unnecessary waste. However, Lean Enterprise must not be
misconstrued as a rigid concept requiring various tools or practices. Rather, the theory of
Lean Enterprise discussed in this thesis encourages Honeywell to use tactics that best meet its
unique needs, and to remain flexible to change in the future. Through taking calculated risks
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in critical inventory management, dedicating resources to improving root cause issues, and
clearly communicating and following up with employees, suppliers, and customers,
Honeywell Engines can truly become a high performing organization that is an asset to all its
stakeholders.
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APPENDIX
Lean Enterprise Self Assessment Tool - Modified Survey28
LESAT Category
IA Enterprise Strategic
Planning
1 = Not Doing/Not Aware 2 = Aware, starting 3 = Using, room for improvement
4 = Very good, minor improvement 5 = Perfect, could teach this!
#I Question/Item
Lean thinking is used in strategic planning process (new engine marketing/sales,
1 procurement, delivery commits, etc).
2 Focus for strategic planning is on customer value.
We leverage the "extended enterprise" (keep suppliers in the loop, use their
3 feedback in our planning process).
Averages
IB Adopt Lean Paradigm I "Lean" (Six Sigma Plus) education is provided for enterprise leaders.
2 Senior Management is committed to Lean/Six Sigma (both in words and action).
3 There is a "Lean Enterprise" vision for this organization.
The organization feels a sense of urgency, which is a driving force for Lean/Six
4 Sigma.
Averages
IC Focus on Value 1 There is general understanding of the current value stream.
Stream Enterprise Flow (single piece flow of material and information) is used (no holdups
2 for material or information).
3 There is a Future Value Stream in place to match the vision for the organization.
4 Performance measures drive enterprise behavior to work towards Lean/Six Sigma.
Averages
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ID Develop Lean
Structure and Behavior
IE Create & Refine
Transformation Plan
IG Focus on Continuous
Customer Improvement
IID Manage Supply
Chain
1
2
3
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
Enterprise is organized to support value delivery to customers (OTTR w/high
quality).
Relationships are based on mutual trust (we-we, not us/they).
We have open and timely communication - information exchanged when required.
Employees are empowered to make decisions at the lowest levels to achieve value
delivery to customers (OTTR w/high quality).
There is incentive alignment - rewarding behaviors we want.
Innovation is encouraged - people are not risk averse, rather calculated risks or
bringing up new ideas is encouraged and rewarded.
Lean change agents - inspiration and drivers of change - can be found and are
excited about their jobs (not just HOS people).
Averages
Enterprise Level Lean Transformation plan in place, shows steps to fulfill lean
enterprise vision.
Commit resources for Lean improvements - part of their performance review.
Provide education and training for those expected to use Lean principles, give real
time help and have management act as role models.
Averages
Structured Continuous Improvement process - everyone knows what steps to take
to get their ideas considered/implemented.
Monitoring Lean Progress - track metrics real time, everyone can see what the
Lean goals are, and where organization stands to them in real time.
Nurturing the process - executives are involved in Lean goals, know how
organization stands to Lean measurements, and discusses them openly.
Capturing Lessons learned - successes are captured and discussed, and those
involved are openly acknowledged (encourages further success).
Impacting enterprise strategic planning - results lead to more strategic opportunities
to improve value to customers (like a domino effect).
Averages
Define and develop supplier network - core competencies/goals are aligned across
entire supply network (i.e. on time delivery, high quality)
Optimize network-wide performance - How do suppliers perform to the shared
goals which ultimately lead to end customer value.
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I
Foster innovation and knowledge-sharing throughout the supplier network:
incentivize suppliers to be innovative and transfer their technology to you and other
3 suppliers for the greater good.
HlE Produce Product Utilize production knowledge and capabilities for competitive advantage -
1 manufacturing capability is a strategic advantage.
Establish and maintain a Lean Production System - defect free production pulled
2 by the customer (and supported by management).
Averages
IIIA Lean Organizational Financial system supports Lean Transformation - there is financial info associated
Enablers with Lean ($ saved, $ spent on training, etc) ; all financial personnel involved
1I understand why it is needed.
Enterprise stakeholders pull required financial information - data is available on
2 request.
Propagate the Learning Organization - employees are flexible and can perform
3 various tasks as necessary.
Enable the Lean enterprise with information systems and tools - information and
knowledge flows smoothly, people can get it when they need it, no one feels
4 embarrassed or nervous about asking questions.
Integration of environmental protection, health and safety into business - everyone
5 understands "cleaner, healthier, safer" and it is practiced as well as preached.
IIIB Lean Process
1 Process Standardization - consistency and re-use (everyone does things the same).
Enablers
Common tools & systems - similar databases used, people can access from
2 wherever they go/whatever they do - provides insight to value stream.
Variation reduction - reduce uncertainty by reducing variation (build times, engines
3 built/tested per week (day), quality issues per engine.
" . .
A
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